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The military is developing new doctrine, such as Ship to Objective Maneuver 
(STOM), to take advantage of emerging technology.  The problem is that new command 
and control organizations are not being developed to execute this new doctrine.  The 
insistence that the tried and true Commander, Amphibious Task Force/Commander, 
Landing Force (CATF/CLF) organization or similar structure will do the job hinders the 
full effectiveness of this new doctrine. 
STOM removes the need for massive build up ashore in an amphibious operation.  
Instead, using naval forces as a sea base, the assault force moves sufficient military 
strength directly to a point at which it can accomplish the mission.  This allows the 
landing force commander to stay on board, thus negating the need for two commanders. 
The Expeditionary Battle Staff (EBS) is a possible solution to this problem.  A 
combination of the Amphibious Squadron and Marine Expeditionary Unit staffs, EBS has 
one commander.  Using emerging C2 technology, the commander directs the assault from 
the sea.  EBS is designed to have a commander from either the Navy or Marine Corps, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Amphibious warfare, also known as expeditionary warfare, is in its current state 
because of painstaking research, experimentation, and battlefield trials.  Yet, within the 
past five to ten years, technology has paved the way for a transformation in the manner in 
which the Untied States military, the Navy and Marine Corps in particular, conduct 
Expeditionary Operations.  The publishing of the Marine Corps’ Ship To Objective 
Maneuver (STOM) paper is one product of that transformation.  Put simply, the paper 
envisions an amphibious assault from the sea but without the laborious, time intensive 
buildup of power ashore.  In fact, all operations would be supported from the sea by a sea 
base.  This raises all kinds of issues.  The issue this paper will address is of the command 
and control nature.  Will the current CATF/CLF command structure support such a 
change in doctrine, or would it require the creation of a new chain of command?  It stands 
to reason that with changes in doctrine come changes in methods in executing that 
doctrine.  This thesis will study the advantages and plausibility of an integrated Navy-
Marine Corps staff providing the command and control needs necessary to accomplish 
STOM. 
The second chapter provides a brief history of amphibious doctrine and C2 with 
emphasis on its effect upon current military thinking.  For more than 60 years the 
doctrine that the Marine Corps developed for the Pacific Campaign of World War II has 
been the guiding light for expeditionary operations.  The Commander, Amphibious Task 
Force/Commander, Landing Force (CATF/CLF) concept coupled with the “Iron 
Mountain” (the buildup of logistics ashore) amphibious doctrine has dominated 
expeditionary thinking, and for good reason.  This marriage of ideas has been researched, 
experimented on and battle tested since the 1930s.  Since it has been so successful and 
refined over the years, it has been institutionally entrenched in military planning. 
The third chapter is a summary of three published works of military doctrine.  
This chapter will summarize the three doctrines by which the Expeditionary Battle Staff 
exists.  The author assumes the reader is already familiar with the concepts presented 
here.  The summary is presented to ensure the relevant ideas are presented before arguing 
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the case for a new command and control organization.  If the reader is not familiar with 
these concepts, then the published works themselves are provided in the Appendices. 
The fourth chapter introduces the Expeditionary Battle Staff (EBS) and compares 
it to the CATF/CLF concept with respect to Iron Mountain, Ship to Objective Maneuver 
(STOM), Sea Basing, and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW).  The purpose of 
EBS is not to create another type of staff.  An Amphibious Squadron staff has certain 
duties and billets to see that those duties are performed.  The same situation occurs with 
the command staff of a Marine Expeditionary Unit.  The functions are combined into one 
staff so all of the responsibilities of both staffs are fulfilled.  The real change in the way 
EBS is structured is at the very top.  There is one Commander.  This allows for a more 
unified command under a Sea Based STOM scenario.  EBS also answers many of the 
improvements called for in EMW.  The chapter closes with a proposal for an experiment: 
Can EBS work in a JTFEX with a Sea Based-STOM scenario? 
Before proceeding though, it is necessary to qualify the EBS.  EBS is effective 
only if the following assumptions are met: 
• The Marine Corps’ Ship To Objective Maneuvering (STOM) is a proven 
and practiced doctrine. 
• The MV-22 Osprey or some other heavy lift aircraft which supports 
STOM is operational and in the fleet. 
• Sea basing is a proven and practiced doctrine. 
Each of the above assumptions is still in the development phase.  Each has its own 
critiques and problems that still need to be worked out.  In fact, the Navy/Marine Corps 
team is working toward perfecting the above for use in the future. 
Recently, the Navy has created the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG).  The ESG 
is similar to an Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (CVBG), but with different capabilities.  In 
addition to the three-ship Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG), the ESG contains an 
Aegis Cruiser (CG), an Aegis Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG), and a fast attack 
submarine (SSN).  The composition of the additional forces might vary from time to 
time.  These additional vessels bring a strike capability, through the use of Tomahawk 
Land Attack Missiles, the ARG historically lacked.  The EBS could be used as the C2 
organization for the ESG as well. 
3 
This thesis discusses changing the organization of Command and Control among 
the Phibron and MEU staffs in light of STOM.  The merits and problems of STOM, Sea 
basing, and the MV-22 will not be debated here.  In fact, these assumptions are all 
dependent upon one another.  In addition, the organizational change in C2 proposed in 
this paper will not work and will not be necessary if these issues are not solved in a 
successful manner. 
With all of the evidence presented, the case for EBS should be compelling.  At the 
very least, it should force the military planners to rethink the idea of placing a 60-year-
old command and control doctrine into a brand new concept of operations.  Hopefully, it 
will do much more than that.  Hopefully, it will stimulate those that make the important 
decisions at the top of the Navy/Marine Corps team to take a long hard look at improving 
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE C2 
A. DOCTRINE 
In order to proceed with the case of a new command and control structure for an 
Amphibious Readiness Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU) staff, it is 
necessary to review how we arrived here in the first place.  The Joint Doctrine for 
Amphibious Operations states the following: 
Amphibious operations have four key characteristics. 
Integration between the Navy and landing forces. 
The key characteristic of an amphibious operation is close coordination and 
cooperation between the Amphibious Task Force (ATF), the Landing Force (LF), and 
other designated forces. 
Rapid buildup of combat power from the sea to shore. 
The salient requirement of an amphibious assault is the necessity for swift, 
uninterrupted buildup of sufficient combat power ashore from an initial zero capability to 
full coordinated striking power as the attack progresses toward amphibious force 
objectives. 
Task–organized forces 
These forces are capable of multiple missions across the full range of military 
operations to enable joint, allied, and coalition operations. Amphibious forces are task-
organized based on the mission. 
 Unity of Effort and Operational Coherence. 
The complexity of amphibious operations and the vulnerability of forces engaged 
in amphibious operations require an exceptional degree of unity of effort and operational 
coherence.(JP 3-02 xi) 
Three of the four characteristics of amphibious operations as stated in the Joint 
Publication for Amphibious Operations are relevant to this discussion.  The third bullet, 
Task Organized Forces, is not relevant because this paper addresses command and 
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control issues, not the ability to be task organized.  The relevance of the remaining bullets 
will be clear in time. 
Another item in doctrine that needs to be addressed now concerns the phases of an 
amphibious operation.  They are as follows: 
 
PLANNING 
The planning phase normally denotes the period extending from the 
issuance of an order that directs the operation to take place and ends with 
the embarkation of landing forces. However, planning is continuous 
throughout the operation. Although planning does not cease with the 
termination of this phase, it is useful to distinguish between the planning 
phase and subsequent phases because of the change that may occur in the 
relationship between amphibious force commanders at the time the 
planning phase terminates and the operational phase begins. 
 
EMBARKATION 
The embarkation phase is the period during which the landing forces, with 
their equipment and supplies, embark in assigned shipping. The 
organization for embarkation needs to provide for flexibility to support 
changes to the original plan. The landing plan and scheme of maneuver 
ashore are based on conditions and enemy capabilities existing in the 
operational area before embarkation of the landing force. A change in 
conditions of friendly or enemy forces during the movement phase may 
cause changes in either plan with no opportunity for reconfiguration of the 
landing force. The extent to which changes in the landing plan can be 
accomplished may depend on the ability to reconfigure embarked forces. 
 
REHEARSAL 
The rehearsal phase is the period during which the prospective operation is 
rehearsed for the purpose of: 
Testing the adequacy of plans, timing of detailed operations, and combat 
readiness of participating forces 
Ensuring that all echelons are familiar with plans 
Providing an opportunity to reconfigure embarked forces and equipment 
Rehearsal may consist of an actual landing or may be conducted as a 







The movement phase is the period during which various elements of the 
amphibious force move from points of embarkation or from a forward-
deployed position to the operational area. This move may be via rehearsal, 
staging, or rendezvous areas. The movement phase is completed when the 
various elements of the amphibious force arrive at their assigned positions 
in the operational area. 
 
ACTION 
The decisive action phase is the period from the arrival of the amphibious 
force in the operational area, through the accomplishment of the mission 
and the termination of the amphibious operation. (JP 3-02 I-7) 
B. BRIEF HISTORY 
For the past 60 or more years that the Navy-Marine Corps team has been 
studying, developing and practicing the art of amphibious operations, the concept always 
revolved around what the second bullet says, a “rapid build up of combat power from the 
sea to shore.” 
 Jeter Isely and Philip Crowl in their book The US Marines and Amphibious War 
say this about amphibious warfare. 
There is nothing occult about amphibious fighting.  Man has conducted 
landing operations since the beginnings of naval history.  The British have 
always been interested in amphibious strategy, and are continuing to make 
notable contributions to its study.  Over a century ago, moreover, a keen 
continental student of military history, Antoine Henri Jomini, enumerated 
the broad precepts on which all of the purely amphibious phases of war 
have been based.  These were to deceive the enemy as to the point of 
debarkation, to select a beach with hydrographic and terrain conditions 
favorable to the attacker, to employ naval guns in preparing the way for 
the troops, to land artillery at the earliest practicable moment, and 
strenuously to push the invasion by seizing the high ground commanding 
the landing area, thus securing the beachhead from enemy guns, allowing 
a quick build up of supplies ashore, and permitting the transfer of the 
conflict from amphibious to land warfare. (Isely and Crowl 4) 
 
Isely and Crowl also say: 
Securing a beachhead at a place where enemy resistance is weak or 
altogether absent is but the application of common sense to amphibious 
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strategy.  (General Alexander) Vandegrift, in reporting on the 
Guadalcanal-Tulagi campaign, phrased it neatly: “A comparison of the 
several landings leads to the inescapable conclusion that landings should 
not be attempted in the face of organized resistance if, by any combination 
of march or maneuver, it is possible to land unopposed and undetected at a 
point within striking distance of the objective. (Isely and Crowl 9) 
 
Who would be conducting these operations? 
The Fleet Marine Force, by tradition and through indoctrination a part of 
the navy, was the logical arm to land in assault. Marines were prepared to 
push through to a rapid victory thus satisfying another cardinal principle 
of amphibious warfare – to finish the fighting ashore with the greatest 
speed possible – and this expedited the unloading of amphibious shipping, 
permitting it to turn around quickly, leave the danger zone, and reload for 
the next operation. (Isely and Crowl 11) 
This way of thinking is derived from the United States’ campaign in the Central 
Pacific during World War II.  These operations “demanded the employment of strong 
assault forces to fight their way ashore, and the concepts that were derived from their 
campaign against the Japanese still dominate US amphibious thinking.”(Evans 10)  
Recently, the Navy/Marine Corps team has proposed new doctrine to take advantage of 
emerging and developing technologies.  These will be discussed later. 
C. THE IRON MOUNTAIN AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO C2 
Amphibious operations are centered on the need to establish a foothold on a beach 
near an objective, be it tactical or strategic.  The purpose of the foothold is to secure an 
area from which the invading force can be supported by a logistical train involving 
maritime shipping.  This foothold is sometimes affectionately called the Iron Mountain 
on the Beach.  This is the geographic location that is so heavily guarded that the enemy 
would be hard pressed to retake it.  “Local maritime and air superiority are essential for 
the passage of the force and the landing.  They enable the beachhead to be isolated from 
enemy reinforcement and attack, so that the ships can be unloaded swiftly and in relative 
safety, and allow the landing force to have continuous naval and air support during the 
operation.”(Evans 93)  For good reason, though, for without this Iron Mountain, the 
invading force would quickly lose its teeth for want of supplies.  Everything the force 
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needs is brought via ship to this point; supplies like ammunition, water, food, fuel, and 
mail (always an important staple for a soldier).  This Iron Mountain is the lifeblood by 
which the invading force survives. 
Naturally, this area is to be prized by the invaders, but not just for supplies.  This 
is where the Headquarters, or the Command and Control (C2) center, is located.  All 
operations inland are supervised and coordinated from this location.  For any military 
operation, there must be a supported commander or the ‘guy in charge’.  The current 
doctrinal title “Commander, Landing Force” (CLF) will be used.  One of the main 
reasons for securing the beachhead is to provide a place ashore for the CLF.  When the 
beachhead is established, “the CLF will transfer his Headquarters…to the beachhead.” 
(Evans 197)  The CLF continues to direct operations ashore from this new headquarters.  
The reason for this is obvious.  Given that the C2 systems of the time would not allow the 
CLF to direct operations ashore while embarked, it only made sense that the commander 
would be where the action was in order to make timely decisions in conducting the 
assault.  The technology of the day did not allow for any other way. 
D. CLF AND CATF 
Up until now only the role of the CLF has been discussed.  The other component 
of the chain of command is the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF).  This is 
the officer in charge of the naval assets responsible for delivering the Landing Force.  
These assets include the ships on which the Landing Force was embarked, ship mounted-
guns by which the landing force receives its supporting fires and through which the beach 
is initially assaulted, mine warfare units, aerial reconnaissance, combat aircraft, and, 
when they are in the Area of Operations (AOR), the supply ships carrying the needed 
staples discussed above.  Unlike the CLF, the CATF stays on his flagship for the entire 
operation and even takes his ships elsewhere when the assault is completed, though this is 
sometime after the initial assault. 
Under the old amphibious doctrine, CATF and CLF were co-equal for planning, 
with equal access to the common superior during this phase, but the CATF assumed 
overall command at the beginning of the Embarkation phase. By mutual agreement, once 
sufficient combat power had been built up, the CLF would assume command of the 
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forces ashore.  The CATF retained command of the Navy assets, or more precisely he 
retained all the assets he previously commanded less those the CLF assumed command of 
ashore.  The CLF did not work for the CATF after command was established ashore. 
Under the new Joint Doctrine, the relationship changed.  The CATF/CLF, two-
commander role is still used, but the concept now follows a supported/supporting 
commander concept.  This can cause even more confusion as both commanders still 
retain co-equal status during the planning phase.  The new doctrine even has the two 
commanders swapping roles during certain types of amphibious operations (see Section 
B-1 in Chapter IV). Clearly, there is a need to improve this organization.  Anybody who 
can imagine having two bosses can understand the problems with rank equality in 
commanders in a military environment.  This relationship will be discussed more in 
Chapter IV. 
These two commanders, the CATF and the CLF, along with their staffs, form a 
team.  Together this combined staff goes through the five phases of an amphibious 
operation mentioned previously. 
With all of this work involved in the planning and execution of an amphibious 
operation, it is essential that, 
The commanders must be suited both by temperament and experience to 
co-operate with each other.  They must not only be able to enjoy each 
other’s confidence and to work as a team but each commander should 
have a broad knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the other 
Services. (Evans 97) 
Although the overall command lies with the CATF, he is, in some respects, really 
the first among equals, since the CLF while afloat retains an equal status with the 
commander of the amphibious task force in whose ships he is embarked with regard to 
planning the amphibious operations.  “In simple terms, the commanders are co-equals 
responsible for making plans for their own services, although these are coordinated by the 
CATF and, in the last resort, the buck stops with him!”(Evans 97)  This command 
relationship only emphasized the need for both commanders to have a relationship similar 
to that described in the above paragraph. 
11 
This mission, studying and perfecting amphibious warfare, is one of the top duties 
of the Navy-Marine Corps team.  It is undertaken so that, irrespective of technological 
changes, the amphibious assault and all its derivatives are always feasible.  This is 
happening to this day.  As technology changes, the doctrine must also change to take 
advantage of new tools and methods made available to us.  The next three chapters are 

























This chapter will summarize the three doctrines by which the Expeditionary 
Battle Staff exists.  The author assumes the reader is already familiar with the concepts 
presented in this chapter.  The summary is presented to ensure the relevant ideas are 
presented before arguing the case for a new command and control organization.  If the 
reader is not familiar with these concepts, then the published works themselves are 
provided for in the Appendices. 
A. SHIP TO OBJECTIVE MANEUVER 
The following list contains the relevant issues concerning Ship to Objective 
Maneuver (STOM) and the Expeditionary Battle Staff.  The complete document is 
provided in Appendix A. 
• Landing forces strike directly from the ships to the objective without 
regard for geography. 
• Emerging technologies are altering the nature of expeditionary operations. 
• There will always be a requirement for forcible entry from the sea. 
• Amphibious forces will remain over the horizon to counter ever increasing 
coastal and air defense systems. 
• Amphibious maneuver replaces the ship-to-shore movement. 
• STOM emphasizes sea-based command and control, logistics, and fire 
support. 
• Securing the beach head for C2 and logistics is no longer needed. 
• Amphibious operation terminates with mission accomplishment, not 
transfer of command ashore. 
B. SEA POWER 21/SEABASING 
This section contains a summary of Sea Power 21, of which sea basing is a part.  
Sea Power 21 was developed to be a guide to how the Navy will organize and transform 
for the 21st century.  It contains three main concepts.  Those concepts are Sea Strike, Sea 




The following are some of the products Sea Strike brings to warfare arena: 
• Amplified, effects-based striking power 
• Enhanced warfighting contribution of Marines and Special Forces. 
• 24/7 offensive operations 
• Persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
• Time-sensitive strike 
• Electronic warfare / information operations 
• Ship-to-objective maneuver (Clark, Oct 02) 
 
The following are some of the products Sea Shield brings to the warfighter and 
our allies. 
• Projected defense for joint forces and allies ashore 
• Sustained access for maritime trade, coalition building, and military 
operations 
• Enhanced international stability, security, and engagement 
• Sea / littoral superiority 
• Force entry enabling  
Sea Basing, the third leg of this triad and the focus of this section, is actually a 
core competency.  At least, it needs to be if this paper will be useful in promoting a new 
C2 organization.  Sea basing provides the Joint Force Commander with an autonomous 
sovereign base of operations that functions in international waters free from hindering 
coalition requirements.  To that end, sea basing provides global command and control, 
and logistical support for military operations ashore. (Clark, Oct 02) 
The impact of Sea Basing includes: 
• Pre-positioned warfighting capabilities for immediate employment  
• Enhanced joint support from a fully netted, dispersed naval force  
• Strengthened international coalition building  
• Increased joint force security and operational agility  
• Minimized operational reliance on shore infrastructure 
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Sea Basing brings the following capabilities: 
• Enhanced afloat positioning of joint assets 
• Offensive and defensive power projection 
• Command and control 
• Integrated joint logistics 
• Accelerated deployment and employment timelines (Clark, Oct 02) 
To sum up, without Sea Basing, most of what is proposed in this paper could not 
be accomplished. 
C. EXPEDITIONARY MANEUVER WARFARE 
The third and final piece of doctrine to be summarized is the Marine Corps 
“capstone concept” Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.  The document is included in its 
entirety in Appendix C.  For the reader who has a working knowledge of this publication, 
the following are the relevant concepts to keep in mind as the case for the Expeditionary 
Battle Staff is made. 
• Sea basing allows Marines to commence sustainable operations without 
buildup of the Iron Mountain ashore. 
• Changes in operational concepts may necessitate changes in organization 
employment and deployment. 
• Organizational structure must be mission oriented. 
• Maneuver in all dimensions – sea, land, and air. 
• C2 will remain at sea. 
• Developmental effort required to improve C2 
• Integration required of both Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, 
systems, and acquisition strategies. 
D. SUMMARY 
The concepts listed above have a direct bearing on the need for a new command 
and control organization.  For further reading or information, all three documents are 
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IV. EXPEDITIONARY BATTLE STAFF 
A. DESCRIPTION 
There is no secret formula for the composition of the Expeditionary Battle Staff 
(EBS).  An Amphibious Squadron staff has certain duties and has billets to see that those 
duties are performed.  The same situation occurs with the command staff of a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit.  These functions are combined into one staff so that all of the 
responsibilities of both staffs are fulfilled.  The real change in the way EBS is structured 
is at the very top. 
The Commander will be either a Flag officer or a General Officer.  The Deputy 
Commander/Chief of Staff will be either a senior Navy or Marine Corps O-6.  Both 
billets will be on an opposite rotation.  In other words, if the Navy fills the Commander 
billet with a Rear Admiral, then the Marine Corps will fill the Deputy Commander/COS 
billet with a senior Colonel.  The same works the other way.  If the Marine Corps fills the 
Commander billet with a Brigadier General, then the Navy will fill the Deputy 
Commander/COS billet with a senior Captain.  When each Commander and Deputy 
Commander complete their respective tours, then the billets will swap services, and the 
cycle will repeat.  Each service fills every other Commander billet and Deputy 
Commander Billet.   Both billets should be relieved on staggered relief schedule, but no 
more than six months apart.  This provides time for turnover and maintains continuity in 
the relieving process. 
When EBS was first envisioned, it was done so with the assumption that for larger 
expeditionary operations, there would be aircraft carrier battle group support, 
commanded by a rear admiral (O-7, ‘one star’).  Under the current doctrine, the 
PHIBRON commander is a Navy captain and the MEU commander is a Marine Corps 
colonel.  That means that the supported commander, for whatever phase of the 
expeditionary operation would be an O-6, and the supporting commander would be 
someone of higher rank.  Conventional military thinking requires (with few exceptions) 
that the supported commander be at least of equal rank to the supporting commanders.  
This provides the supported commander with some authority to accomplish the mission 
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without rank impeding the process.  EBS solves that problem by making the commanding 
officer’s rank that of a flag or general officer with all the authority intrinsic in the rank to 
lead such a mission. 
The fact that there is one commander provides a Unity of Command even more 
focused than CATF/CLF could ever provide.  This concept will be explored in the 
following discussion. 
B. ANALYSIS OF THE EBS 
This section will look at the advantages of the EBS with respect to the emerging 
doctrines of Ship to Objective Maneuver, Sea Basing, and Expeditionary Maneuver 
Warfare.  But first, it is necessary to review where the Navy and Marine Corps have been 
to understand why change is necessary. 
1. CATF/CLF/Iron Mountain 
CATF/CLF is accepted doctrine.  It might be too obvious to say, but that is why 
CATF/CLF has lasted so long.  Granted, that statement is a little oversimplified, but this 
current doctrinal concept is the only one that fits into the military’s 60-plus year old 
model of amphibious warfare.  The current joint publication on amphibious warfare uses 
it profusely.  It starts like this: 
An amphibious force is defined as an amphibious task force (ATF) and a 
landing force (LF) together with other forces that are trained, organized, 
and equipped for amphibious operations.”(JP 3-02 ix) (Emphasis added.) 
Now a commander is needed for each force, a Commander, Amphibious Task 
Force and a Commander, Landing Force.  The publication says further: 
The terms “commander, amphibious task force” (CATF) and 
“commander, landing force” (CLF) have been used doctrinally in the past 
to signify the commanders assigned to spearhead amphibious operations.  
This doctrine disassociates (from previous doctrine) any historical 
implications of the terms “CATF” and “CLF” from command relations.  
The terms “CATF” and “CLF” do not connote titles or command 
relationships.” (JP 3-02 ix) 
While this doctrine ceases using CATF and CLF as titles, it is apparent that the 
concept in the doctrine is still well entrenched.  The purpose of this new doctrine is to fit 
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the CATF/CLF concept into the Joint Doctrine, a direction where the military will 
continue to move in the future. 
The Joint Forces Commander is empowered to choose the best command 
relationship to accomplish the mission. 
The command relationships established among the CATF, CLF, and other 
designated commanders of the amphibious force is an important decision.  
The type of relationship chosen by the common superior commander, or 
establishing authority, for the amphibious force should be based on 
mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, C2 
capabilities, battlespace assigned, and recommendations from subordinate 
commanders.” (JP 3-02 II-3) 
Here is an example concerning authority of the CATF/CLF in the planning phase. 
In a support relationship, the CATF and CLF and other commanders 
designated in the order initiating planning for the amphibious operation 
are coequal.” (JP 3-02 II-6) (Emphasis added) 
What about during the operation?  Who is in command?  Someone has to be 
ultimately accountable.  The pub reads further: 
If not specified in the order initiating the amphibious operation, the CATF 
and CLF will determine who has primary responsibility for the essential 
tasks during the mission analysis in the planning process.”  (JP 3-02 II-6)  
(Emphasis added) 
There is even a figure in the pub detailing who has command, or more officially 
who is the supported commander, depending on mission requirements.  For instance, if 
the mission is assault, then the CATF will begin the mission as the supported commander 
and then when the CLF transfers command ashore he will become the supported 
commander.  If the mission is a raid with a coastal threat then the supported commander 
will be the CATF, followed by the CLF, and then back to the CATF.  If the mission is an 
inland raid with no coastal threat, then the CLF is the supported commander.  If it is a 
demonstration, then the CATF is the supported commander.  A withdrawal mission is an 
assault mission in reverse, so the supported commander is the CLF, followed by the 
CATF.  For humanitarian assistance, either commander can be chosen. (JP3-02 II-7) 
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What is the point of all this?  Two points.  First, the CATF/CLF doctrine remains 
a core function of the command and control in current expeditionary operations.  The 
second point is a little more difficult to explain.  In an expeditionary operation, there are 
two schools of expertise.  One set of experts is the Navy.  These are the men and women 
who operate the ships carrying the Marines to the target.  The other set was just 
mentioned, the Marines.  The Marine Corps is expert on transferring from ship to shore in 
a combat situation.  As an aside, combat is defined here as any situation where there 
might be hostile individuals or groups of individuals who object, violently or otherwise, 
to the presence of foreign troops (read Marines) on their soil.  Combat does not have to 
be in wartime. 
Back to the second point.  Neither expert is an authority in the other’s field.  
Therefore, both must work together to accomplish an expeditionary mission, because 
such a mission involves land, sea and the connecting area in between, the beach.  It 
follows that for both phases of the expeditionary mission, that of operations at sea and 
operations on land, there would be a supported commander.  The fact that each are 
coequal during the planning phases, and absent direction from higher authority, the 
CATF and CLF decide themselves who has command for what areas of the operation 
boggles the mind.  There is supposed to be ONE commander.  There is but ONE person 
in whom accountability and responsibility lies.  All through military history there is one 
general or one admiral who gets the credit or the disgrace for the outcome of a campaign. 
Expeditionary warfare, however, is a little different; at least as it has been for the 
past 60 years.  In the case of the CATF/CLF concept, it is a perfect marriage when 
dealing with an expeditionary mission.  This seemingly illogical command and control 
system of a “shared” authority works for this application.  With the current doctrine and 
technology, expeditionary forces need to establish a beachhead, the Iron Mountain, upon 
which the logistics center and command center can resupply and provide direction, 
respectively, in order to accomplish the mission. 
Does the Navy and Marine Corps need an alternative to the CATF/CLF concept 
with respect to the current doctrine?  Absolutely not!  Any alternative could not hope to 
compete with a tried and true concept with more than 60 years of research, 
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experimentation and operational experience to support it.  Even if such an alternative 
were better, CATF/CLF is too institutionalized to be replaced with a superior method. 
2. CATF/CLF With Respect to STOM and Sea Basing 
What if the Iron Mountain is done away with?  What if all expeditionary 
operations were based on the ships?  What if technology, equipment and doctrine had 
matured and evolved to a point where the mission would be executed on land and 
resupply would come from the sea?  Then would CATF/CLF still be applicable? 
This dilemma could be debated utilizing the same criteria used by the CATF/CLF 
argument in conjunction with the direction in which the Navy and Marine Corps are 
headed in the future.  The action by which the CLF transfers his command to shore after 
the beachhead has been established immediately raises at least two questions. 
The first question is why, under STOM, is there a beachhead in the first place? 
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver calls for rapid projection of combined arms 
teams ashore, but emphasizes sea-based command and control, logistics, 
and fire support. (STOM II-14)  (Bold type added) 
The most important reason to have a beachhead is for logistical support and 
resupply.  The second most important reason to have a beachhead is for command and 
control; to establish an HQ on the ground, closer to the engagement.  STOM’s focus is to 
move away from that method and apply “the principles and tactics of maneuver warfare 
to the littoral battlespace. (STOM II-10) 
The Marine Corps even comes out and gives its opinion about the future of 
beachhead establishment. 
True ship-to-objective maneuver is not aimed at seizing a beach, but at 
thrusting combat units ashore in their fighting formations, to a decisive 
place, and in sufficient strength to ensure mission accomplishment. 
(STOM II-7) 
The next question is why under STOM is the CLF going ashore?  Again the 
Marine Corps says the following: 
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Ship-to-Objective Maneuver calls for rapid projection of combined arms 
teams ashore, but emphasizes sea-based command and control, logistics, 
and fire support. (STOM II-14)  (Bold type added) 
Because one of the goals of STOM is to have sea-based C2, there is no reason for 
the supported commander to go ashore.  Then how will the commander be able to 
conduct the operation?  This is accomplished by a combination of his direction and the 
initiative of his subordinate commanders.  How will this be possible?  How will the 
subordinate commanders on the ground be able to safely conduct operations to achieve an 
objective? 
Command and control provides the mechanism by which a commander 
recognizes what needs to be done and communicates those actions 
required to ensure mission accomplishment.  Maneuver warfare 
emphasizes decentralized execution with subordinate commanders 
exercising the maximum possible latitude in performing assigned 
missions.  Command and control systems must provide landing force 
commanders at all echelons a common operational picture and the 
connectivity to monitor execution and to influence events when necessary. 
(STOM II-21) 
There are two issues to note.  The first is the emphasis on decentralized execution.  
The second issue is that the tactical commanders need not only a common operational 
picture, but also the means to act on the information they are receiving.  In the current 
doctrine the C2 system allowing that does not exist.  The tactical commanders do have 
some autonomy, but they have to rely on a combination of what they see in their limited 
battle space and what the CLF at HQ (on the beachhead) can tell them over a radio.  
Clearly, the C2 systems the Navy and Marine Corps require for STOM negate the need 
for the CLF to go ashore. 
Now that the CLF can stay on board, there exist two commanders in one 
battlespace.  The point could be argued that, with the CLF remaining on board, he 
becomes the supported commander for the entire operation.  STOM even says so in the 
following: 
Placing responsibility on the landing force commander for controlling 
movement from the ship to the objective is a significant departure from 
current doctrine. The organization and coordination agencies of the naval 
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force must adapt to fully exploit the advantages offered by new 
technology. (STOM II-23) 
In other words, put the ships under the direct command of the CLF.  At least, that 
is one interpretation of that quote.  The same logic that supports putting the CLF in 
command of naval assets also supports putting the CATF in charge of ground forces.  
More on this later. 
It is clear that at first glance, and even digging beneath the surface a little, the 
current command and control doctrine does need to be reassessed in light of the emerging 
concepts of Sea Basing and Ship To Objective Maneuver.  What is essentially happening 
is the following.  The Navy and Marine Corps have published visions of new doctrine 
such as, Sea Power 21, Ship to Objective Maneuver, Operational Maneuver From the 
Sea, and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.  We also have a command and control 
doctrine (CATF/CLF) that has existed for over 60 years.  The new doctrine is a radical 
change from that which the military has currently.  (The writer includes the entire 
military here because concepts such as Sea Basing could change the way all branches of 
the military do things in the future.)  Yet, the existing CATF/CLF model is expected to 
take this new doctrine into the 21st century.  Of course, each document calls for 
improvements in Command and Control, but in one of the last paragraphs of Ship to 
Objective Maneuver, it mentions the same old Landing Force Commander.  Maybe it’s 
time to reexamine the command concept as well. 
3. EBS/STOM/Sea Basing 
The Expeditionary Battle Staff streamlines the command and control processes 
called for in Ship to Objective Maneuver and provided for in Sea Basing.  In fact, STOM 
anticipates C2 systems that allow for one commander. 
Ship-to objective maneuver takes advantage of emerging mobility and 
command and control systems to maneuver landing forces in their 
tactical array from the moment they depart the ships, replacing the 
ponderous ship-to-shore movement of current amphibious warfare with 
true amphibious maneuver. (STOM II-6) 
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Emerging technologies represented by the Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAAV), MV-22 aircraft, global positioning system (GPS), and 
developing command and control systems will radically alter the nature 
of amphibious operations.(STOM II-4) 
Successful implementation of the Ship-to-Objective Maneuver concept 
will require improvements in mobility, command and control, 
intelligence, fires, sea-based logistics, organization, doctrine, training, and 
education.(STOM II-20) 
While this change complicates pre-H-Hour unit actions and coordination, 
these challenges can be overcome through exploitation of increased 
maneuver space, improved command and control, and precision location 
and navigation systems.(STOM II-17) 
The command and control system will provide the commander with the 
ability to see and influence the battlefield, while giving subordinate 
maneuver commanders the freedom to exploit fleeting opportunities. 
(STOM II-14) 
Possible interpretation of some of the above quotes can define ‘system(s)’ to be 
technological.  Some are in fact technological.  However, a command and control system 
can also be a process, a procedure, or an organization such as CATF/CLF or, in this case, 
EBS. 
Now, take all of the above quotes about command and control and put them in the 
perspective of the following quotes: 
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver calls for rapid projection of combined arms 
teams ashore, but emphasizes sea-based command and control, logistics, 
and fire support.(STOM II-14) (Emphasis added) 
The amphibious operation does not terminate with the transfer of 
command ashore, but rather with the accomplishment of the 
mission.(STOM II-15) 
The point is that the supported commander will be, and stay, at sea. 
The next idea has already been touched on, but needs to be reemphasized.  It has 
been said previously that STOM, by definition, negates the need for a beachhead.  This 
concept reinforces the fact that a commander does not need to go ashore.  The nature of 
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EBS assumes that all staff functions can be handled while embarked.  There is no 
provision for going ashore for an extended period of time.  This could be considered a 
weakness in the structure and will have to be examined for a solution. 
Because operations will be conducted from the sea, and the sea will be used as a 
maneuver space, the supported commander will have to be at sea.  This idea has been 
established.  The question remains: Why have two commanders?  CATF/CLF is 
redundant where STOM is concerned.  With the EBS there is only one commander.  This 
emphasizes the concept of Unity of Command.  Unity of Command is a well-accepted 
principal of war, and is especially important in an expeditionary/amphibious operation.  It 
is challenging, but not impossible under CATF/CLF.  With EBS, again, there is one 
commander, unifying both Naval and Marine Corps forces under a flag or general officer. 
4. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare and EBS 
This paper has looked briefly at whether or not EBS is suitable for Ship to 
Objective Maneuvering and Sea Basing.  The third and final doctrinal example will be 
the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. 
STOM changes the way of executing amphibious warfare by getting rid of the 
ship to shore movement and replacing it with amphibious maneuver. (STOM II-6)  The 
basis for Maneuver Warfare comes from the Marine Corps’ paper “Expeditionary 
Maneuver Warfare” written by none other than the former Commandant of the Marine 
Corps himself, General Jones.  In this paper, the general points to sea basing as an 
integral part of this new doctrine, and like STOM, he points out the need for C2 to remain 
at sea. 
C2, combat support, and combat service support capabilities will remain at 
sea to the maximum extent possible and be focused upon supporting 
expeditionary air and land operations ashore. (EMW 6-7) 
In what possibly refers to STOM, EMW says the following: 
In partnership with the Navy, Marine forces will use the capabilities of 
bases and stations and selected naval platforms as “launch pads” to flow 
into theater. (EMW 7) 
 
26 
This is simply more evidence that new doctrine is emerging to handle the 
changing global environment of our world.  With new doctrine comes the need for a new 
way of implementation.  EMW appreciates that need. 
Realizing EMW’s full potential will require a developmental effort 
focused on improving C2….  Achieving these improvements will require 
integration of both Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, systems, 
and acquisition strategies. 
Changes in operational and functional concepts may necessitate changes 
in the integrating concepts of organization, deployment, and employment.  
(EMW 10) (Emphasis added) 
As previously shown, EBS is, in fact, an integration of Navy and Marine Corps 
C2 structures, and it is most certainly a revolutionary change in a fundamental concept. 
EMW also states the need for “seamless C2 capabilities throughout the 
battlespace.” (EMW 12)  The paper is primarily referring to the technological 
improvements that can provide such capabilities, but the requirement can be applied to 
the chain of command as well.  With EBS, one commander provides direction throughout 
the mission, from start to finish.  There is no transfer of command from a Sea commander 
to a Land commander.  That idea removes a ‘seam’ from the battlespace.  Granted, that’s 
quite a stretch of interpretation.  However, with one chain of command for an entire 
operation, no turnover issues are present.  Most of the operations envisioned by STOM 
are fast paced with no room or time to stop and take a break.  What would happen if 
during the course of events a turnover were to occur, even if it’s at an appropriate time?  
The fast pace of operations would quickly leave the new commander out of the loop 
requiring him to waste precious time playing “catch-up”.  With EBS, no such dangerous 
time wasting is required. 
5. Problems and Disadvantages 
It is not possible to successfully debate an issue without looking, at least briefly, 
at its problems.  One such problem includes the command and control issues should 
operations ashore require additional time.  “Additional time” meaning that troops stay 
ashore longer than the ships can stay at sea or off the coast of the objective.  Such a 
scenario could require that the invading force maintain a presence indefinitely.  How 
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would the EBS adapt to such a requirement?  Granted there are so many variables to 
factor in, it would depend on the specific situation.  But the question remains, what if? 
This next problem is the antithesis of the reason why CATF/CLF works so well in 
the current doctrine.  CATF/CLF has been researched, experimented on and battle tested.  
With the exception of a little research on the concept by this author, EBS has none of 
these.  In fact, currently it is little more than an intellectual exercise that is functioning as 
a thesis.  In defense of EBS, amphibious warfare was considered close to impossible until 
the Marine Corps started looking at it in the 1930s.  Not until measures were taken to 
eventually perfect the art was it accepted as a truly effective way to wage war.  If EBS, or 
a variant thereof, is to become the new command and control concept of the 21st century, 
then it will have growing pains as well.  It needs to be researched further.  If research 
finds EBS to be viable, then experiments need to be conducted.  If those are successful 
and promising, then implementation in the field is the next logical step.  If it doesn’t 
work, fine.  Something else will take its place.  If it does work, though, then the 
Navy/Marine Corps team will have stumbled on part of the glue that holds the doctrine of 
the next 60 or so years together. 
Before EBS can work, the Navy and Marine Corps must remove at least three 
obstacles in their path.  A couple of these have been inferred indirectly from the previous 
discussion.  They are as follows: 
• Ship To Objective Maneuvering (STOM) must be a proved and practiced 
doctrine. 
• The MV-22 Osprey or some other heavy lift aircraft which supports 
STOM is operational and in the fleet. 
• Sea Basing must be a proved and practiced doctrine. 
Each one of these assumptions is still in the development phase.  Each also has its 
own critiques and problems that still need to be worked out.  In fact, the Navy/Marine 
Corps team is working toward perfecting the above for use in the future.  EBS could 
never hope to compete with CATF/CLF in the current doctrinal environment.  Therefore, 




C. PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF EBS INTO JTFEX 
The previous section mentioned experimentation.  There are many ways to 
experiment to determine whether or not EBS is the appropriate command and control 
system for emerging doctrines.  One such method involves inclusion of the staff into a 
Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX) prior to an Amphibious Readiness Group’s 
deployment.  Other methods include a Fleet Battle Experiment or an exercise especially 
designed to test this concept.  Before doing so, however, the assumptions mentioned in 
the previous section must be reviewed. 
• The Marine Corps’ Ship To Objective Maneuvering (STOM) must be a 
proved and practiced doctrine. 
• The MV-22 Osprey or some other heavy lift aircraft which supports 
STOM is operational and in the fleet. 
• Seabasing must be a proved and practiced doctrine. 
As stated previously, these issues need to be solved before any implementation 
can proceed. 
1. Exercise Description 
The exercise scenario would be constructed in accordance with that which is 
envisioned by the Marine Corps’ Ship to Objective Maneuver and the Navy’s Sea Power 
21.  A Commander and Deputy Commander would be chosen to command the blue 
forces (the good guys).  The Commander’s staff would be a combination of both the 
Phibron and the MEU staffs, as described earlier in this chapter. 
Since the scenario would include red force opposition between the blue force and 
its objective, the Commander would be supported by a carrier battle group.  The battle 
group will provide services such as close air support, fires, logistics, mine warfare assets, 
etc.  This emphasizes the need for the supported commander to be of at least equal rank 
to his supporting commanders. 
The EBS should be assembled at least six months prior to exercise 
commencement.  This is to ensure that the new staff has time to develop and work 





Both the EBS and the personnel in charge of the exercise would evaluate the 
performance of the integrated staff.  The evaluation will attempt to answer the following 
questions with respect to both the exercise and the preparation time preceding it. 
• Does the Expeditionary Battle Staff provide an improved command and 
control environment over CATF/CLF with respect to STOM, Sea Basing, 
and EMW? 
This is the very crux of the issue.  The answer will determine the 
future of EBS.  How does one measure improvement?  It is 
difficult without conducting another exercise simultaneously and 
comparing the two organizations.  One measure of effectiveness 
might be the time required for mission accomplishment.  The faster 
the time might imply that decisions were made in a more expedient 
manner because of EBS.  Another MOE might be how much time 
is saved by not communicating with a command post ashore, but 
by simply walking up to the commander on board for direction.  
Lastly, how did the planning process proceed with only one 
commander to answer to? 
• Where is the location of the office space for the EBS while ashore? 
This may seem trivial at first glance, but if subordinates cannot 
communicate with the command staff in a timely manner, 
communication breaks down and the commander loses touch with 
those under his command.  The problem is a little more extreme 
for the Atlantic Fleet because there are several hundred miles 
between the ARGs and the MEUs.  For the Pacific Fleet, the 
separation is less than 60 miles.  Would there be detachments at 
each location with the main office at the discretion of the CO?  Or 
would there be an office somewhere in the middle? 
• What is the best relief cycle for the Commander and Deputy? 
This question really can’t be solved in an exercise.  It would take a 
few years to experiment on a rotation.  However it turns out, one 
thing is clear.  If the staff is commanded by officer of one 
particular service for too long, that staff takes on the likeness of 
that service.  This can be dangerous as both services each bring 
expertise to the table.  The best relief cycle is one that ensures the 
staff continues to operate in an effective hybrid of Navy and 
Marine Corps C2. 
• Are number and type of billets sufficient to accomplish the mission? 
The irony here is that there are never enough bodies!  However, this 
is a real issue.  One MOE might be that for all of the tasks required 
by the staff, there existed the organic expertise and man power to 
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accomplish them.  Currently staffs do augment by taking personnel 
from the ships in the Phibron.  That might be an acceptable way of 
doing things in the future as well. 
• Should there be any billet modifications? 
This is a follow on to the previous question.  Are there billets the 
staff doesn’t need?  Conversely, are there tasks that the staff is 
totally incapable of performing because it lacks the subject matter 
experts?  Or are there redundant billets that could save manpower?  
Experience will determine the need. 
• Does EBS support STOM? 
This refers to many of the above quotes calling for an improvement 
of C2 in STOM and EMW.  Is EBS the improvement that STOM 
intended?  One MOE would be to determine how well the flow of 
information moves up and down the chain of command. 
• Does this solve the supported/supporting commander issue? 
This refers to the supporting commander being of a higher rank to the 
supported commander.  Does the EBS commander’s elevation in 
rank give him more pull in accomplishing the mission?  The point 
could be argued rather successfully that this would be the case. 
• How does EBS support putting the force ashore for an extended period? 
This is a sticky point in the sense that the probable answer would be 
in the negative.  It also begs the question, if EBS is for a STOM 
operation, and STOM does not support putting a force ashore on a 
semi-permanent basis, then would EBS apply?  If STOM was 
designed for a relatively short in-and-out operation then the answer 
is no.  If the mission requires troops be put ashore for an extended 
time period, and the sea basing infrastructure exists to support it, 
then a CLF would probably be better suited for this type of 
command. 
• Is the EBS scaleable?  Can EBS work with a MEB or a MEF? 
The answer to this question could probably be found with a little 
critical thinking.  First of all, if the CNO and the Commandant 
dictate EBS to, in fact, be scaleable then yes.  It would happen.  
That being said, would it work without such a decree?  If EBS was 
designed for STOM, and STOM was envisioned to employ a 
MEU-sized force to accomplish an objective, then, no, EBS is not 
scaleable.  If STOM wasn’t designed to work with a brigade-sized 
force or larger, then EBS doesn’t apply. 
• How well does EBS work in a Joint environment? 
The number one MOE in this case is can the ARG/MEU accomplish 
the mission that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) assigns it?  
How well does the information flow up and down the chain of 
command?  Does the EBS operate with Joint doctrine or 
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Navy/Marine Corps doctrine, or a combination of both?  And is it 
effective. 
• What doctrine shall EBS use? 
For the purposes of this question, doctrine is defined as the 
procedures by which the Navy and Marine Corps operate.  Various 
examples present themselves: Logistics, tactical air control, 
communications and tactical nets, force protection, and the list 
goes on and on.  Both services do the same task differently.  So 
before ever reaching an exercise such as a JTFEX, each of these 
procedures should be reviewed.  Then the decision needs to be 
made, through Command Post Exercises, simulations, drills, etc., 
which procedure will be followed for each individual task.  This is 
part of the six-month familiarization period for the new staff. 
 
It’s possible that not all of these questions can be answered right away, and there 
are many more not mentioned above.  That is the purpose of experimentation.  With 
enough information, an educated assessment of the EBS concept can be made.  
Hopefully, improvements, either directly or indirectly, will be made in the way the 
military conducts business in the future because of this concept. 
It is possible that JTFEX would not be an appropriate time to evaluate a new 
command and control organization.  In case of failure, what happens during the 
deployment?  A possible solution would be to make the entire deployment an experiment, 

















This paper has described both a command and control organization known as 
CATF/CLF and a doctrine in which CATF/CLF is employed.  In fact, CATF/CLF works 
rather well with the Iron Mountain logistical build up ashore.  However, as this paper has 
shown, the military has expressed its desire to depart from such traditional doctrine in 
favor of a sea-based logistical supply center where the sea is treated as a maneuver space, 
referring, of course to Ship to Objective Maneuver.  This sea base also houses the 
command and control center of the operation, negating the need for a commander ashore.  
If there is no need for a land-based commander, why is the CATF/CLF still used?  
Logically, there would only be a need for a CATF or a CLF. 
The Expeditionary Battle Staff reorganizes both chains of command to form one 
staff with one commander.  On page 25 of this paper STOM mentions giving that 
command to the landing force commander.  The paper encourages giving command of 
sea assets to an individual who has no experience of operating such forces.  If the Marine 
Corps does not consider this to be a problem, then logically, the reverse could also be 
true: an Admiral could command ground forces.  This is one of the key elements that 
make EBS work.  The commander could be from either service.  Yet, a commander is 
only as good as his staff.  If a general has staff members who possess naval experience, 
then commanding naval assets seems reasonable.  Likewise, it is also reasonable if an 
admiral has staff members who are Marines and understand Marine Corps tactics. 
Does this mean EBS is the best command and control system for this new 
doctrine?  The author does not make that assertion.  Only with experiments like the 
JTFEX mentioned in Chapter 5, a Fleet Battle Experiment, or some other experiment will 
the true potential of EBS be discovered. 
This is what the author asserts:  Technology, equipment and doctrine are 
evolving, yet the command and control organization is not.  There is an old proverb about 
putting new wine in old wineskins.  The same applies in this case.  One cannot develop a 
new doctrine without providing a suitable command and control organization to 
administer it.  Yet, that is what is happening.  Actually, it seems like the CATF/CLF 
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organization is being modified to fit the new doctrine when a whole new organization is 
needed instead.  At the very least, it is the author’s intent to encourage the ladies and 
gentlemen making the hard decisions at the top to undertake a review of current 
command and control organizations.  This review would determine that new 
organizations are needed to meet the demands of emerging new doctrines and 
technologies. 
The Expeditionary Strike Group was mentioned in Chapter I.  EBS could easily 
be used as a C2 organization to command an ESG.  A few billets would need to be added 
to the staff to handle the strike capability, and the additional vessels’ operations.  But the 
value of an ESG is far greater than not having one.  If STOM is to succeed, it will need 
strike assets, ships capable of supporting fires to a range many miles inland, and close air 
support.  As of right now, with current ship’s gunnery technology, the ESG still lacks the 
capability to give supporting fires from the sea as envisioned in STOM.  This is also true 
in the area of Close Air Support (CAS).  While the MEU has aircraft for that purpose, 
true CAS will not be achieved without support from a CVBG.  Technology will mature in 
the near future to solve the supporting fires issue as well.  What’s the point of this?  The 
perfect command and control organization for an ESG would be the EBS.  In fact, Carrier 
Group One has already researched the subject and has developed a command staff similar 
in concept to the EBS.  If expeditionary operations is the direction in which the Navy and 
Marine Corps will go in the future, than ESGs will be here to stay.  And they would 




Department of Defense.  Joint Publication 3-02: Joint Doctrine for Amphibious 
Operations.  Washington  D.C., 2001. 
 
Department of the Navy.  “Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.”  Headquarters, United 
States Marine Corps.  Washington D.C., November 2001. 
 
Department of the Navy.  “Forward…From the Sea.”  Department of the Navy.  
Washington D.C., May 1996. 
 
Department of the Navy.  “Operational Maneuver from the Sea.”  Headquarters, United 
States Marine Corps.  Washington D.C., June 1996. 
 
Department of the Navy.  “Ship to Objective Maneuver.”  Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command Quantico, VA, July 1997. 
 
Evans, Michael.  Amphibious Operations: The Projection of Sea Power Ashore.  London: 
Brassey’s, 1990. 
 
Isely, Jeter, and Crowl, Philip.  The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1951. 
 
Moore, Charles.  “Sea Basing: Operational Independence for a New Century.”  
Proceedings January, 2003: pp 80-85 
 
Clark, Vern.  “Sea Power 21: Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities.”  Proceedings 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
37 
APPENDIX A SHIP TO OBJECTIVE MANEUVERING 
This appendix contains verbatim the Marine Corps’ paper “Ship to Objective 
Maneuver.”  This paper states that certain capabilities need to be improved, among them, 
command and control.  The new operational concept contained in this paper provides part 
of the basis for the Expeditionary Battle Staff, this thesis’ attempt to improve command 
and control in an ARG.  Thus, the reason for its inclusion is to provide the reader with a 
context to better understand the application for EBS. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose 
The armed forces of the United States require a force projection capability that 
will secure early and decisive advantages over their enemies.  Forcible entry capabilities 
are a key element of joint doctrine for force projection. Applying the approach to naval 
warfare outlined in the Department of the Navy White Papers . . . From the Sea and 
Forward . . .From the Sea, U.S. Naval Forces use command of the seas to gain access 
and freedom of action in the world’s littorals.  Taking the operational maneuver space 
offered by the sea, U.S. forces turn the sea and littorals into vulnerable flanks for 
potential enemies, assailable at the time and place of the naval commander’s choosing.  
The Marine Corps operational concept for maritime power projection, Operational 
Maneuver from the Sea, establishes clear goals for accomplishment of the objectives of 
the White Papers.  These goals are the foundation for the development of implementing 
concepts and capabilities.  This paper presents one of the key implementing concepts, 
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, and initiates the Combat Development Process to provide 
the tools with which the concept will be realized. 
2. Background 
Marines operate from the assault ships of the U.S. Navy amphibious forces to 
perform forcible entry missions.  Such ships provide the combat systems which facilitate 
amphibious operations.  These combat systems include efficient operating platforms for 
launch, recovery, and maintenance of landing craft and aircraft; command, control, 
communications, and intelligence systems; logistical support; unit and staff 
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accommodations; damage control; and offensive and defensive weapons suites.  The 
ships of the Amphibious Task Force (ATF) can transport, project ashore, support, 
recover, and redeploy Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs).  The critical forward 
presence role of Navy and Marine forces is most effective when MAGTFs are deployed 
on board amphibious ships supported by other Navy combatant forces.  Such offshore 
concentrations of force are independent of requirements for bases, ports, airfields, or 
overflight.  They provide the United States with a credible deterrent and immediately 
available combat power should deterrence fail. 
Operational Maneuver from the Sea describes rapid maneuver by landing forces 
from their ships directly to objectives ashore, uninterrupted by topography or 
hydrography. Naval forces must dispense with previous amphibious methods in which 
operational phases, pauses, and reorganizations imposed delays and inefficiencies upon 
the momentum of the operation. 
Technologies available during the early stages of modern amphibious warfare 
development -- particularly in the areas of mobility, navigation, and command and 
control -- dictated that the Navy provide both the means of landing force movement and 
its control.  The result was frequently a slow buildup ashore as slow-speed water craft 
executed an intricate ship-to-shore shuttle from ships operating close to the beach.  The 
landing force was required to secure a lodgment until combat power could be built up 
sufficiently to allow maneuver to the actual objective.  Practical considerations in 
establishing such a beachhead reduced the littoral area vulnerable to attack. 
Emerging technologies represented by the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
(AAAV), MV-22 aircraft, global positioning system (GPS), and developing command 
and control systems will radically alter the nature of amphibious operations.  Landing 
force units will possess their own mobility systems -- and have the ability to 
independently navigate across the ocean surface to penetrate the enemy’s shoreline at 
points of their choosing.  Freed from the constraints of securing a large beachhead, the 
commander will be able to focus on the enemy and begin the landing force’s maneuver 
from over the horizon.  These new capabilities will enable tactical commanders to make 
decisions as the situation develops to exploit enemy weaknesses and maintain the 
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momentum of the attack from the ship to the objective.  This combination of maneuver 
warfare philosophy and emerging technologies will provide the naval force with 
enhanced combat effectiveness.  This paper, Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, describes this 
new tactical concept for conducting amphibious forcible entry. 
3. The Battlefield 
The requirement for forcible entry from the sea is enduring.  Such operations will 
be accomplished by converting littorals into the enemy’s vulnerable flank, obtaining 
leverage against his operational center of gravity.  Regardless of the presence of adjacent 
land bases, amphibious forces provide the joint force commander a credible and 
sustainable forcible entry capability. 
Hostile combined arms forces supported by integrated air and coastal defense 
systems remain the greatest threat to landing forces.  From mobile or fixed positions, 
defending forces may attempt to deny landing sites or counter friendly maneuvers ashore.  
Landing forces may face any combination of obstacles, mines, artillery, missiles, aircraft, 
submarines, small boats, air defense artillery, and mobile reaction forces.  The enemy 
may attempt to defeat or disrupt the amphibious force by contesting control of the air, 
surface, or subsurface battlespace.  He may attack the naval force at sea, attempt to repel 
the landing force during the assault phase, counterattack on land to eject the landing 
force, or any combination of the above.  He will employ an array of decoys, deceptive 
devices and electronic countermeasures to thwart efforts to identify and target his 
defenses. 
The amphibious force and other elements of the naval force will offset these 
challenges by remaining over the horizon, using the expanded battlespace the sea offers 
to impede enemy targeting and provide more reaction time to defeat counterstrikes.  From 
this tactically advantageous position, the landing force will be able to maneuver across an 




Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) requires new tactical concepts for 
amphibious operations.  Although the focus is on operational objectives ashore, the sea 
becomes essential maneuver space for the landing force.  Successful execution of 
operational maneuver from the sea demands that the landing force maintain the 
momentum gained by maneuver at sea – through ship-to-objective maneuver.  The 
landing force generates overwhelming tempo and overmatches enemy weaknesses with 
its power and rapidity of execution.  Tactical flexibility, combined with reliable 
intelligence, will allow it to bypass, render irrelevant, or unhinge and collapse the 
enemy’s defensive measures. 
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) employs the concepts of maneuver warfare 
to project a combined arms force by air and surface means against inland objectives.  
STOM takes advantage of emerging mobility and command and control systems to 
maneuver landing forces in their tactical array from the moment they depart the ships, 
replacing the ponderous ship-to-shore movement of current amphibious warfare with true 
amphibious maneuver.  Historically, reliance on Navy command and control during ship-
to-shore movement and the requirement to establish a lodgment ashore worked counter to 
the principles of maneuver warfare.  By executing STOM, landing forces will exploit 
advanced technologies, which will permit combined arms, maneuver from over-the-
horizon attack positions through and across the water, air, and land of the littoral 
battlespace directly to inland objectives. 
True STOM is not aimed at seizing a beach, but at thrusting combat units ashore 
in their fighting formations, to a decisive place, and in sufficient strength to ensure 
mission accomplishment.  Landing forces will engage enemy units only as necessary to 
achieve the freedom of action to accomplish operational objectives. 
STOM provides the opportunity to achieve tactical as well as operational surprise, 
something seldom possible in past amphibious operations.  Operations will begin from 
over the horizon and project power deeper inland than in the past, progressing with speed 
and flexibility of maneuver that will deny the enemy warning and reaction time.  By 
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requiring the enemy to defend a vast area against our seaborne mobility and deep power 
projection, naval forces will render most of his force irrelevant.  If the enemy chooses to 
withhold a strong mobile reserve, he will be attacked with long-range fires.  His thinly 
spread defenses will allow friendly forces greater freedom of maneuver at sea and ashore.  
Preassault operations will confuse and deceive the enemy, locate and attack his forces, 
and further limit his ability to react.  Naval forces will take advantage of the night and 
adverse weather conditions, as well as the ability to control the electromagnetic spectrum.  
These capabilities will enable exploitation of known enemy vulnerabilities, create 
opportunities, achieve tactical surprise, and result in mission accomplishment. 
2. Principles 
The key element of OMFTS adapts combined arms penetration and exploitation 
operations to the environment described in Operational Maneuver from the Sea.  The 
result is littoral power projection that exploits significant improvements in tactical 
mobility to achieve enhanced combat power, and provides theater and joint force 
commanders a greater range of war fighting options.  Ship-to-objective maneuver: 
•  Focuses on the operational objective and provides increased flexibility for 
landing force commanders to strike enemy critical vulnerabilities.  No longer tied to 
phased operations and the cumbersome development of suitable beachheads, the landing 
force will concentrate on rendering the enemy ineffective. 
•  Treats the sea as maneuver space. For the force that controls it, the sea is 
both a protective barrier and highway of unparalleled mobility.  Turning the enemy’s 
vulnerable flank, or exploiting gaps in his positions, the landing force thrusts combat 
units by air and surface deeply into his defensive array.  Such maneuvers unhinge the 
enemy position, making his dispositions increasingly vulnerable and, finally, untenable. 
•  Emphasizes intelligence, deception, and flexibility to drive planning, option 
selection, and maneuver execution.  Naval forces exploit preassault operations to deceive 
the enemy, determine his dispositions, attack his critical vulnerabilities, and initiate 
action to gain tactical advantage.  They execute these operations specifically to find or 
create exploitable gaps.  The common tactical picture provided to all commanders by 
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advanced command and control systems, combined with the inherent flexibility of 
STOM, will allow the landing force to exploit such gaps. 
•  Applies strength against weakness and projects combat power through gaps 
located or created in the adversary’s defenses.  These gaps are not necessarily 
geographical; they may be exploitable weaknesses, such as limited night fighting 
capability, poor command and control, lack of endurance or low morale.  While the 
landing force will attempt to bypass the enemy’s defensive strength, it may be necessary 
to neutralize or destroy critical positions in the defensive array, including coastal strong 
points, in order to cause a rapid disintegration of the enemy force. 
•  Creates overwhelming tempo and momentum.  Air and surface units 
maneuver from ships to inland positions faster than the enemy can effectively react.  The 
landing force maintains the initiative and operates at a pace that allows it to dictate the 
terms of engagement.  Operational surprise, through a combination of secrecy, deception, 
ambiguity, electronic warfare, lethal attack, and tactical successes, delays enemy 
recognition and disrupts his response.  Complementary actions that fix, confuse, or 
neutralize the enemy support the rapid and uninterrupted thrust of combat power to 
decisive points ashore.  The enemy will continually face dilemmas and a tempo of 
operations that denies him control of the battle and keeps him off-balance and reactive. 
•  Integrates all elements in accomplishing the mission.  Whether operating in 
a joint or combined environment, the naval forces will employ all available assets in 
support of STOM in order to maximize the effectiveness of the landing force. 
C. OPERATIONS 
1. Overview 
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver applies the principles and tactics of maneuver 
warfare to the littoral battlespace.  Specifically, it will allow for conducting combined 
arms penetration and exploitation operations from over the horizon directly to objectives 
ashore without stopping to seize, defend, and build up beachheads or landing zones.  
Landing forces will conduct ship-to-objective maneuver by executing plans which are 
detailed, but flexible.  A focus on the overall objective will drive planning and the 
scheme of maneuver ashore, allowing commanders to base decisions (such as the time 
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and place of landing) on enemy gaps, movement of enemy reserves, or other events.  
Surface and vertical maneuver elements will be employed to accomplish the mission, 
producing a cumulative effect greater than the sum of the parts.  Application of maneuver 
warfare principles in the execution of ship-to-objective maneuver will require a number 
of changes to current doctrine, to include: 
(1)  Landing force maneuver will begin upon crossing the line of departure 
(LOD).  The assembly areas will be the ships themselves, and attack positions will be 
well offshore. 
(2)  Assault elements will depart their ships knowing the plan in effect and will 
proceed from at-sea attack positions to the LOD. 
(3)  Movement parallel to the shore may occur at any point between leaving the 
ships and crossing the high-water mark.  The shift from amphibious task force control to 
landing force control will occur at or before the LOD. 
(4)  At any point after reaching the attack position, tactical commanders on the 
scene may choose to vary their attack formations and axes and give other tactical 
directions based upon the changing situation and commander’s intent. 
(5)  Tactical commanders plan landing force maneuver options so that they can 
exploit up-to-date information and cross the beach at the most advantageous points.  They 
would normally seek gaps in the enemy defenses, but sometimes operational 
considerations may require a deliberate assault against a defended position. 
Four new coordination measures will be needed to control maneuver forces in the 
expanded battlespace of ship-to-objective maneuver:  Littoral Penetration Area (LPA), 
Littoral Penetration Zone (LPZ), Littoral Penetration Site (LPS), and Littoral 
Penetration Point (LPP).  These are defined as follows: 
Littoral Penetration Area - A geographic area designated for purposes of 
command and control through which naval forces conduct littoral penetration 
operations.  This area must be of sufficient size to permit the unrestricted conduct of sea, 
air, and land operations.  Normally one LPA will be associated with each possible 
objective area. 
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Littoral Penetration Zone - LPAs can be subdivided into smaller geographical 
zones to enhance command and control or to facilitate coordination of maneuver and 
fires.  Each LPZ can contain several alternative axes for use by vertical or surface 
assault forces. 
Littoral Penetration Site - A continuous segment of coastline within an LPZ 
through which landing forces cross by surface or vertical means. 
Littoral Penetration Point - A point in an LPS where the actual transition from 
waterborne to land borne movement occurs (“feet wet” to “feet dry” for flying elements). 
Capitalizing on the precision location and navigation capabilities of the landing force, an 
LPP need only be large enough to support the passage of a single craft, but it may be 
used by a maneuver element or series of maneuver elements passing in column. 
When the terrain provides adequate space, the maneuver element may cross the 
LPP in its tactical formation.  As maneuver elements touch down on the shore, the 
transition from maneuver on the sea to land maneuver must be seamless, allowing the 
force to maintain momentum and tempo so as to conduct deep penetrations and reach 
inland objectives quickly.  The landing force will attack enemy critical vulnerabilities, 
creating and exploiting new opportunities until achieving a decisive advantage.  Vertical 
and surface maneuver forces bring complementary capabilities to the battle, permitting 
operations to continue unabated until the forces achieve their objectives.  Vertical assault 
forces may attack key positions within the enemy defenses and continue to maneuver on 
the ground or repeat their vertical assaults on subsequent objectives.  Surface assault units 
accomplish assigned missions and keep pressure on the enemy, either linking up or 
maneuvering in tandem with the vertical assault units. 
The command and control system will provide the commander with the ability to 
see and influence the battlefield, while giving subordinate maneuver commanders the 
freedom to exploit fleeting opportunities.  Plans will be based on accurate intelligence, 
but an understanding of the commander’s intent will permit maneuver unit commanders 
to adapt their actions to the changing situation. 
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Ship-to-Objective Maneuver calls for rapid projection of combined arms teams 
ashore, but emphasizes sea-based command and control, logistics, and fire support.  
Improved information connectivity allows the landing force command element to remain 
at sea, capable of effective command, but better protected from enemy attack.  When 
afloat, the headquarters retains direct influence upon naval support operations, but does 
not drain scarce landing force combat and logistic resources.  The seabasing concept calls 
for ships of the amphibious task force to serve as floating combat service support 
platforms to resupply the combat units rapidly and directly, fully exploiting the lift and 
mobility offered by landing craft, air cushion (LCAC) and vertical take-off and landing 
(VTOL) aircraft.  By seabasing most supporting fires, landing force vulnerability and 
footprint ashore are significantly reduced, greatly improving freedom of maneuver and 
enabling the naval force to project ashore combat formations which are leaner, lighter, 
and more effective. 
In Ship-to-Objective Maneuver, the distinction between advance force operations 
and the assault fades.  Historically, amphibious operations have relied on successful 
preassault operations.  A dedicated advance force which preceded the main body of the 
amphibious task force conducted deception operations, mine clearing, fire support, and 
obstacle reduction in the objective area.  While such tasks remain critical to the success 
of ship-to-objective maneuver, it may no longer be desirable to establish a separate 
advance force to perform them.  Reconciling the contradictory requirements of preassault 
operations and surprise requires a change in our concept of advance force operations.  
The benefits of surprise are so important that, with the exception of deception, those 
functions which cannot be executed by clandestine means must be performed “in-stride” 
by assault units.  Thus, future operations will emphasize clandestine efforts to determine 
enemy strengths and weaknesses by locating and identifying mines, obstacles, fire 
support units, critical command and control nodes, and force dispositions.  Breaching, 
preparatory fires, and obstacle clearing -- traditionally preassault tasks -- will become an 
integral part of the assault phase. 
As the phasing of the assault changes, so does the organization of the landing 
force.  The separation of the landing force into the five traditional movement categories 
of scheduled waves, on-call waves, prepositioned emergency supplies, remaining landing 
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force supplies, and nonscheduled units disappears in ship-to-objective maneuver.  By task 
organizing landing units into combined arms teams, the requirements for specialized units 
in on-call waves are reduced. 
The amphibious operation does not terminate with the transfer of command 
ashore, but rather with the accomplishment of the mission.  The MAGTF may then either 
transition to subsequent operations ashore, or reembark on board the ships of the 
amphibious task force to prepare for further force projection operations.  A general 
unloading of the landing force will not take place. 
a. Surface Maneuver Force 
The surface assault force consists of self-contained combined arms teams.  
After leaving the ship, these teams maneuver in AAAVs and LCACs over the sea under 
the direction of their tactical commanders, much as land forces maneuver across a desert.  
The rapid movement of this force inland to their objectives reduces landing force 
vulnerability to enemy beach defenses and creates a tempo of operations that will outpace 
the enemy’s ability to react.  The combined arms teams include supply and maintenance 
capabilities that will be replenished and augmented as required from the seabase. 
The flexibility offered by the combination of AAAVs and LCACs will 
provide multiple penetration options for each maneuver element.  Overwhelming combat 
power will be concentrated from several directions using organic firepower of maneuver 
units and sea-based fires.  Highspeed amphibious mobility will enable friendly forces to 
reinforce success quickly by redirecting their efforts toward gaps found or created in 
enemy defenses.  Given the range and speed of the AAAV and LCAC, these forces might 
penetrate the enemy’s coast outside the area they intend to control, and then attack back 
into the vital area.  Subsequent surface elements may not penetrate at the same points as 
initial elements.  As defenses are turned and impediments destroyed, subsequent elements 
will be able to penetrate at the points most advantageous to their mission, rather than 
simply follow in trace. 
b. Vertical Maneuver Force 
A deep vertical envelopment presents the enemy with a dilemma.  If he 
reacts to the vertical assault force, he risks increasing his vulnerability to other vertical 
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assaults, to the maneuver of the surface assault force, and to supporting fires.  If he 
ignores the vertical assault force, it can cause significant damage and seize objectives 
facilitating the surface assault, creating other opportunities for exploitation.  The MV-22 
and CH-53E offer mobility which enables the vertical assault force to attack from over 
the horizon and strike rapidly at deep objectives, reembark, and strike other objectives 
before the enemy can react. 
As with the surface elements, vertical assault units will operate on 
multiple axes and not be restricted to the same Littoral Penetration Points previously 
used.  Furthermore, the endurance and speed of the MV-22 permit multiple lifts and 
extractions of the same unit, providing a flexibility of maneuver seldom before achieved 
in vertical assault operations.  The ability to insert deep and then conduct bounding 
maneuver will allow the vertical assault force to maintain a rapid tempo, exploiting 
freedom of maneuver, destroying the enemy’s forces through supporting fires, without 
allowing the vertical assault force to become decisively engaged. 
2. Planning 
While detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures will evolve, ship-to objective 
maneuver planning will follow the basic doctrinal principles established in Joint 
Publication 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.  Forces will focus planning 
on mission objectives and the scheme of maneuver ashore, culminating in a landing plan.  
The major differences between traditional and future amphibious power projection 
planning are the elimination of the requirement for a force beachhead and the need to 
plan for several schemes of maneuver, all of which must be supported by a single 
embarkation plan.  Future landing forces will attack through littoral penetration points 
that best support accomplishment of the operational mission.  The best option might not 
be the shortest route, but the one that best takes advantage of gaps in the enemy defenses.  
Some situations will require creating a gap by destroying enemy forces. 
Several factors will influence planning for ship-to-objective maneuver.  First and 
foremost is the objective.  Operational Maneuver from the Sea envisions the 
accomplishment of a significant operational or strategic objective.  It is not an assault to 
seize a beachhead.  All decisions will be based upon this overall objective, from landing 
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force missions to the degree of risk acceptable to the force as a whole.  The practical 
implications for the landing force include assembly areas and attack positions that remain 
miles offshore.  While this change complicates pre-H-Hour unit actions and coordination, 
these challenges can be overcome through exploitation of increased maneuver space, 
improved command and control, and precision location and navigation systems. 
Launching the attack from over the horizon will enhance security while expanding the 
potential for surprise. 
The second major factor involves the execution and timing of preassault tasks, 
such as minefield and obstacle breaching.  If such obstacles cannot be avoided, surface 
assault forces must time their landing to coincide with the successful completion of 
breaching operations.  This requires an in-stride breaching capability. 
The third factor which influences planning for ship-to-objective maneuver is task 
organization and embarkation of the landing force.  Since landing forces, especially 
Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), will often deploy prepared and embarked to 
accomplish a variety of missions, the doctrinal sequence of planning, embarkation, 
rehearsal, movement, and assault (PERMA) might often become EMPRA, with 
embarkation and movement occurring prior to the planning, rehearsal, and assault phases 
of an amphibious operation. 
A fourth and closely related factor deals with distances, cycle times, and lift 
availability for the landing.  For the task-organized assault force, launch and coordinated 
movement from widely dispersed ships will require the use of precision location and 
navigation systems to achieve appropriate arrival at the LOD.  Tactical commanders of 
landing force units must coordinate movement of combined arms teams embarked in 
AAAVs and LCACs to maintain unit integrity and combat power.  Different launch 
distances, varying craft and vehicle speeds, and the potential requirement to divert critical 
lift assets to alternate ships as losses occur will complicate coordination. 
Ship-to-objective maneuver requires tactical commanders of individual landing 
units to control their own unit’s movement.  This must include the authority to divert 
through alternate Littoral Penetration Sites or Points, as the situation dictates.  Those 
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permissive tactical control measures used in ground operations will be extended seaward 
and applied to the amphibious assault. 
While less precisely defined than the factors listed above, operations conducted 
with dispersed forces maneuvering over extended distances will impact planning.  
Concentrating combat power, providing fire support, sustaining the landing force, and 
conducting mutually supporting attacks will require extensive planning, training, and 
shared situational awareness. 
3. Execution 
Landing force surface maneuver will require careful coordination between 
elements of combined arms landing teams.  These teams, generally embarked in a mix of 
AAAVs and LCACs, will deploy from a number of dispersed amphibious ships.  Initially, 
the amphibious task force commander will vector units to attack positions seaward of 
their planned Littoral Penetration Sites.  As in a combined arms attack ashore, units will 
use attack positions to complete final preparations by assuming tactical formations, 
confirming orders, and accomplishing any “last minute” tasks.  Attack positions can also 
serve as decision points for selecting a course of action from multiple options supporting 
the scheme of maneuver. 
Different missions, movement rates, and survivability factors will determine the 
sequence and timing of each element through the attack positions.  After crossing the 
LOD, landing elements will begin their run at their Littoral Penetration Points and inland 
objectives.  Amphibious task force and landing force commanders will continue to 
monitor progress, though the landing unit tactical commanders will now have the 
authority to maneuver as required, depending upon the tactical situation.  Attack 
helicopters may escort the AAAV and LCAC-mounted surface force to provide added 
capability against hostile watercraft during the long transit to the objective.  Careful 
coordination by individual unit commanders will ensure that units cross Littoral 
Penetration Points with tactical integrity and cohesion intact, ready to prosecute the 




Resistance at the beach is always possible.  The leading elements of the landing 
force, mounted in AAAVs, will provide supporting arms and direct fire to overcome 
resistance in the vicinity of the LPP.  Leading assault elements will maneuver to clear 
sufficient space, laterally and in depth, to ensure secure offloading of LCACs, while 
continuing the rapid inland penetration uninterrupted. 
In concert with the surface assault, the vertical assault force will maneuver inland, 
using evasive routes, feints, and alternate approaches to confuse enemy defenses.  
Commanders will coordinate vertical assault and surface assault times to achieve 
maximum enemy disruption.  Timing of the landings is designed to maintain tempo and 
overwhelm local defenses.  The number of vehicles or aircraft in each element and the 
time between elements will depend on the mission, enemy situation, and characteristics 
of the Littoral Penetration Zone.  Each landing team may embark on different ships in 
order to facilitate near simultaneous launching as cohesive units.  While such dispersion 
is not ideal for administrative purposes during the movement phase of an operation, it 
will speed the landing of cohesive combat units during the assault phase.  With all of its 
nonamphibious vehicles loaded in LCACs, a tactical commander can maneuver his unit 
so that it will be able to land as a combat team regardless of the number of ships upon 
which it was embarked. 
4. Key Capabilities 
Successful implementation of the Ship-to-Objective Maneuver concept will 
require improvements in mobility, command and control, intelligence, fires, sea-based 
logistics, organization, doctrine, training, and education.  Specific capabilities that we 
must achieve through the combat development process are outlined below. 
a. Mobility 
The landing force must maneuver from attack positions well offshore 
through Littoral Penetration Points and rapidly to inland objectives.  This requires surface 
and vertical assault systems with the speed, range, precision location and navigational 
capabilities, protection, and firepower to launch from over-the-horizon positions, 
maneuver toward any Littoral Penetration Point, and crack the environmental and 
defensive shell of the Littoral Penetration Area while maintaining the momentum of the 
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attack.  The technologies required to provide these capabilities are under development, 
and the combat systems implementing these technologies are the highest acquisition 
priority in the Marine Corps.  These include the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
(AAAV), a highly capable assault support aircraft (MV-22), and surface craft and aircraft 
to deliver equipment and supplies throughout the littoral region.  A force properly 
equipped with the AAAV, LCAC, MV-22 and CH-53E, and supported by sufficient 
numbers of amphibious and support ships, will provide the required operational 
capabilities in the early 21st Century. 
The landing force must also locate, identify, and overcome both natural 
and manmade impediments to mobility.  Mines, obstacles, adverse terrain, and built-up 
areas can all impede the mobility of the landing force.  Just as in land maneuver, the 
surface assault force must be able to penetrate obstacles between the LOD and final 
objectives either through preexisting gaps or by breaching.  To accomplish these tasks, 
robust mine reconnaissance and rapid in-stride breaching capabilities are essential. 
b. Command and Control 
Command and control provides the mechanism by which a commander 
recognizes what needs to be done and communicates those actions required to ensure 
mission accomplishment.  Maneuver warfare emphasizes decentralized execution with 
subordinate commanders exercising the maximum possible latitude in performing 
assigned missions.  Command and control systems must provide landing force 
commanders at all echelons a common operational picture and the connectivity to 
monitor execution and to influence events when necessary. 
c. Intelligence 
Satisfaction of intelligence requirements is critical.  The most immediate 
intelligence priority for Ship-to-Objective Maneuver is locating and identifying enemy 
forces and impediments to mobility.  The landing force will exploit this intelligence 
throughout the operation using “reconnaissance pull” tactics to take advantage of gaps 
while avoiding obstacles and strong points.  Commanders at all levels require timely 
access to all-source intelligence relevant to their immediate needs.  They must be able to 
request and receive specific, real-time, and near- real-time information in a usable format, 
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whether they are embarked, maneuvering toward objectives, or conducting subsequent 
operations ashore. 
d. Fires 
Fire support of ship-to-objective-maneuver must provide immediate and 
responsive high volume suppression and neutralization fires in support of all landing 
force elements.  Unit commanders at all levels will call for and control the fires of 
organic and supporting arms.  Fire support systems must be capable of providing highly 
accurate and lethal long-range fires to simultaneously satisfy the needs of both the 
vertical assault and the surface assault.  Furthermore, these fires must be available 
“around the clock” and in all weather conditions.  Fire support agencies must respond to 
calls for fire with sufficient speed and accuracy to support landing force maneuver. 
e. Information Operations 
Ship-to-objective maneuver relies on surprise, deception and ambiguity to 
create exploitable gaps in the enemy’s dispositions and reactions.  Friendly forces must 
not only have the capability to gain knowledge about the enemy, but also the resources to 
develop and execute convincing deceptions.  Having “painted a picture” for the enemy, 
they must then be able to selectively disrupt and degrade his command and control 
systems to delay his recognition of the actual situation.  The capability to defeat the 
enemy’s command and control system while protecting its own will give the naval force 
an important edge. 
f. Sea-based Logistics 
Sustaining deeply inserted vertical assault forces and rapidly penetrating 
surface assault forces from a seabase presents a critical challenge.  The absence of dumps 
ashore, limited resupply delivery means, and rapidly maneuvering combat forces 
combine to make “logistics push” techniques undesirable and infeasible.  Maneuver units 
will operate under a “logistics pull” concept, drawing support from the floating combat 
service support areas.  This will require total asset visibility and selective offload 
capability within the seabase, and systems for delivering tailored logistic packages 
directly to the using element. 
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g. Organization, Doctrine, and Training and Education 
The human element is as important to the implementation of Ship-to-
Objective Maneuver as are materiel improvements.  Placing responsibility on the landing 
force commander for controlling movement from the ship to the objective is a significant 
departure from current doctrine.  The organization and coordination agencies of the naval 
force must adapt to fully exploit the advantages offered by new technology.  Tactical 
maneuver unit commanders will now direct ship-to-objective maneuver from attack 
positions located beyond the horizon all the way to objectives located deep inland, 
coordinating movement with higher and adjacent units, calling for fires, and making rapid 
decisions to achieve the commander’s intent.  Preparing future naval leaders to deal with 
the challenges and opportunities of conducting maneuver warfare in the littoral 
battlespace will require that: 
•  Naval service schools impart a common understanding of this emerging 
doctrine and its underlying philosophy. 
•  Navy and Marine units develop and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures 
through unit, staff, and task force exercises. 
•  Realistic naval power projection simulations stimulate and encourage initiative, 
imagination, boldness, and rapid decision-making in exercises and in operations. 
D. SUMMARY 
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver is a tactical concept for the conduct of amphibious 
operations in support of Operational Maneuver from the Sea.  It applies maneuver 
warfare concepts to the littoral battlespace.  By doing so, a landing force will be capable 
of seamless maneuver from over the horizon directly against objectives deep inland.  
Through application of the tenets contained in this concept paper, the principles of 
Operational Maneuver from the Sea are integrated with those of maneuver warfare, as 
described in MCDP-1, Warfighting. 
Ship-to-Objective Maneuver and Operational Maneuver from the Sea mark a 
major evolution in amphibious warfare.  These concepts take advantage of innovations in 
technology to enhance the capability of naval forces to conduct amphibious operations in 
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the 21st Century.  Ship-to-Objective Maneuver directly links maneuver at sea to 
maneuver on land, enabling naval forces to fully apply the principles of maneuver 
warfare in support of Operational Maneuver from the Sea.  The improvements in 
doctrine, organization, training and education, and equipment outlined above will result 
in unprecedented operational flexibility and a greatly improved capacity to project power 
ashore. (DON 1997) 
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APPENDIX B SEA POWER 21/SEA BASING 
This appendix explains Sea Basing.  It is the second of three appendices to present 
a doctrinal basis for the Expeditionary Battle Staff.  Section A contains portions of an 
article written by Admiral Vern Clark about Sea Power 21.  Section B contains an article 
on Sea Basing by Admiral Charles Moore.  The contents of both sections have been taken 
verbatim from recent issues of “Proceedings”.  See the bibliography for a more detailed 
reference. 
A. SEA POWER 21 
The 21st century sets the stage for tremendous increases in naval precision, reach, 
and connectivity, ushering in a new era of joint operational effectiveness.  Innovative 
concepts and technologies will integrate sea, land, air, space, and cyberspace to a greater 
extent than ever before.  In this unified battlespace, the sea will provide a vast maneuver 
area from which to project direct and decisive power around the globe. 
Future naval operations will use revolutionary information superiority and 
dispersed, networked force capabilities to deliver unprecedented offensive power, 
defensive assurance, and operational independence to Joint Force Commanders.  Our 
Navy and its partners will dominate the continuum of warfare from the maritime 
domain—deterring forward in peacetime, responding to crises, and fighting and winning 
wars. 
By doing so, we will continue the evolution of U.S. naval power from the blue-
water, war-at-sea focus of the "Maritime Strategy" (1986), through the littoral emphasis 
of ". . . From the Sea" (1992) and "Forward . . . from the Sea" (1994), to a broadened 
strategy in which naval forces are fully integrated into global joint operations against 
regional and transnational dangers. 
To realize the opportunities and navigate the challenges ahead, we must have a 
clear vision of how our Navy will organize, integrate, and transform.  "Sea Power 21" is 
that vision.  It will align our efforts, accelerate our progress, and realize the potential of 
our people.  "Sea Power 21" will guide our Navy as we defend our nation and defeat our 
enemies in the uncertain century before us. 
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The events of 11 September 2001 tragically illustrated that the promise of peace 
and security in the new century is fraught with profound dangers: nations poised for 
conflict in key regions, widely dispersed and well-funded terrorist and criminal 
organizations, and failed states that deliver only despair to their people. 
Previous strategies addressed regional challenges.  Today, we must think more 
broadly.  Enhancing security in this dynamic environment requires us to expand our 
strategic focus to include both evolving regional challenges and transnational threats.  
This combination of traditional and emerging dangers means increased risk to our nation.  
To counter that risk, our Navy must expand its striking power, achieve information 
dominance, and develop transformational ways of fulfilling our enduring missions of sea 
control, power projection, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward presence. 
Three fundamental concepts lie at the heart of the Navy's continued operational 
effectiveness: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.  Sea Strike is the ability to project 
precise and persistent offensive power from the sea; Sea Shield extends defensive 
assurance throughout the world; and Sea Basing enhances operational independence and 
support for the joint force.  These concepts build upon the solid foundation of the Navy-
Marine Corps team, leverage U.S. asymmetric advantages, and strengthen joint combat 
effectiveness. 
We often cite asymmetric challenges when referring to enemy threats, virtually 
assuming such advantages belong only to our adversaries.  "Sea Power 21" is built on a 
foundation of American asymmetric strengths that are powerful and uniquely ours.  
Among others, these include the expanding power of computing, systems integration, a 
thriving industrial base, and the extraordinary capabilities of our people, whose 
innovative nature and desire to excel give us our greatest competitive advantage. 
Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing will be enabled by ForceNet, an 
overarching effort to integrate warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, 
platforms, and weapons into a fully netted, combat force. We have been talking about 
network-centric warfare for a decade, and ForceNet will be the Navy's plan to make it an 
operational reality. Supported by ForceNet, Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing 
capabilities will be deployed by way of a Global Concept of Operations that widely 
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distributes the firepower of the fleet, strengthens deterrence, improves crisis response, 
and positions us to win decisively in war. 
1. Sea Strike 
Projecting decisive combat power has been critical to every commander who ever 
went into battle, and this will remain true in decades ahead.  Sea Strike operations are 
how the 21st-century Navy will exert direct, decisive, and sustained influence in joint 
campaigns.  They will involve the dynamic application of persistent intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance; time-sensitive strike; ship-to-objective maneuver; 
information operations; and covert strike to deliver devastating power and accuracy in 
future campaigns. 
Knowledge dominance provided by persistent intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance will be converted into action by a full array of Sea Strike options—next-
generation missiles capable of in-flight targeting, aircraft with stand-off precision 
weapons, extended-range naval gunfire, information operations, stealthy submarines, 
unmanned combat vehicles, and Marines and SEALs on the ground.  Sovereign naval 
forces will exploit their strategic flexibility, operational independence, and speed of 
command to conduct sustained operations 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, 365 days 
per year. 
When we cannot achieve operational objectives from over the horizon, our Navy-
Marine Corps team moves ashore.  Using advanced vertical and horizontal envelopment 
techniques, fully netted ground forces will maneuver throughout the battlespace, 
employing speed and precision to generate combat power.  Supported by sea bases, we 
will exploit superior situational awareness and coordinated fires to create shock, 
confusion, and chaos in enemy ranks.  Information superiority and networking will act as 
force multipliers, allowing agile ground units to produce the warfighting impact 
traditionally provided by far heavier forces, bringing expeditionary warfare to a new level 
of lethality and combat effectiveness. 
Sea Strike capabilities will provide Joint Force Commanders with a potent mix of 
weapons, ranging from long-range precision strike, to covert land-attack in anti-access 
environments, to the swift insertion of ground forces.  Information superiority will 
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empower us to dominate timelines, foreclose adversary options, and deny enemy 
sanctuary.  Sea Strike operations will be fully integrated into joint campaigns, adding the 
unique independence, responsiveness, and on-scene endurance of naval forces to joint 
strike efforts.  Combined sea-based and land-based striking power will produce 
devastating effects against enemy strategic, operational, and tactical pressure points—
resulting in rapid, decisive operations and the early termination of conflict. 
2. Sea Shield 
Traditionally, naval defense has protected the unit, the fleet, and the sea lines of 
communication.  Tomorrow's Navy will do much more.  Sea Shield takes us beyond unit 
and task-force defense to provide the nation with sea-based theater and strategic defense. 
Sea Shield will protect our national interests with layered global defensive power 
based on control of the seas, forward presence, and networked intelligence.  It will use 
these strengths to enhance homeland defense, assure access to contested littorals, and 
project defensive power deep inland.  As with Sea Strike, the foundation of these 
integrated operations will be information superiority, total force networking, and an agile 
and flexible sea-based force. 
Maritime patrol aircraft, ships, submarines, and unmanned vehicles will provide 
comprehensive situational awareness to cue intercepting units.  When sent to investigate 
a suspicious vessel, boarding parties will use advanced equipment to detect the presence 
of contraband by visual, chemical, and radiological methods.  Forward-deployed naval 
forces will also protect the homeland by engaging inbound ballistic missiles in the boost 
or mid-course phase, when they are most vulnerable to interception.  In addition, our 
nuclear-armed Trident ballistic missile submarine force will remain on silent patrol 
around the world, providing the ultimate measure of strategic deterrence.  These highly 
survivable submarines are uniquely powerful assets for deterring aggressors who would 
contemplate using weapons of mass destruction. 
Achieving battle-space superiority in forward theaters is central to the Sea Shield 
concept, especially as enemy area-denial efforts become more capable.  In times of rising 
tension, pre-positioned naval units will sustain access for friendly forces and maritime 
trade by employing evolving expeditionary sensor grids and advanced deployable 
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systems to locate and track enemy threats.  Speed will be an ally as linked sensors, high-
speed platforms, and improved kill vehicles consolidate area control, including the 
location and neutralization of mines via state-of-the-art technology on dedicated mine 
warfare platforms and battle group combatants.  Mission-reconfigurable Littoral Combat 
Ships, manned and unmanned aviation assets, and submarines with unmanned underwater 
vehicles will gain and maintain the operational advantage, while sea-based aircraft and 
missiles deliver air dominance.  The result will be combat-ready forces that are prepared 
to "climb into the ring" to achieve and sustain access before and during crises. 
Perhaps the most dramatic advancement promised by Sea Shield will be the 
ability of naval forces to project defensive power deep overland, assuring friends and 
allies while protecting joint forces ashore.  A next-generation long-range surface-to-air 
Standard Missile, modernized E-2 Hawkeye radar, and Cooperative Engagement 
Capability will combine to extend sea-based cruise missile defense far inland.  This will 
reinforce the impact of sea-based ballistic missile defense and greatly expand the 
coverage of naval area defense.  These capabilities represent a broadened mission for our 
Navy that will lessen the defensive burden on land forces and increase sea-based 
influence over operations ashore. 
The importance of Sea Shield to our nation has never been greater, as the 
proliferation of advanced weapons and asymmetric attack techniques places an increasing 
premium on the value of deterrence and battlespace dominance.  Sea Shield capabilities, 
deployed forward, will help dissuade aggressors before the onset of conflict.  In addition, 
Sea Shield will complement Sea Strike efforts by freeing aviation forces previously 
devoted to force defense, allowing them to concentrate on strike missions and generate 
far greater offensive firepower from the fleet.  In sum, Sea Shield will enhance crisis 
control, protect allies and joint forces ashore, and set the stage for combat victory—
providing a powerful new tool for joint combatant commanders in this dangerous age. 





B. SEA BASING 
1. Operational Independence 
Sea Basing is the core of "Sea Power 21."  It is about placing at sea—to a greater 
extent than ever before—capabilities critical to joint and coalition operational success: 
offensive and defensive firepower, maneuver forces, command and control, and logistics.  
By doing so, it minimizes the need to build up forces and supplies ashore, reduces their 
vulnerability, and enhances operational mobility.  It leverages advanced sensor and 
communications systems, precision ordnance, and weapons reach while prepositioning 
joint capabilities where they are immediately employable and most decisive.  It exploits 
the operational shift in warfare from mass to precision and information, employing the 
70% of the earth's surface that is covered with water as a vast maneuver area in support 
of the joint force. 
Sea Basing will be increasingly central to joint military planning because the 
traditional advantages enjoyed by afloat forces—such as independence, mobility, and 
security—are becoming ever more important to military affairs, while traditional 
limitations of sea-based forces—including operational reach and connectivity—have 
been largely overcome by new technologies and concepts of operations.  These advances 
in sea-based capabilities could not come at a more critical time, as political and military 
barriers to access ashore are growing worldwide.  Because of these changes, the value of 
Sea Basing in an increasingly interdependent world will continue to rise—providing 
operational freedom for joint and coalition forces, compressing deployment timelines, 
strengthening deterrence, and projecting dominant and decisive combat power from the 
sea. 
In a world of hidden and fleeting enemies, Sea Basing provides the joint force 
commander with dispersed, netted, and sovereign platforms that are ready to respond.  To 
accomplish this mission, the sea base is comprised of distributed forces of many types, 
including carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike groups, combat logistics force ships, 
maritime prepositioning force platforms, and, in the years ahead, high-speed support 
vessels.  Working together, these forces mass effects rather than platforms, increasing 
sensor coverage and force protection while focusing offensive and defensive firepower 
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throughout the battlespace.  This increase in operational effectiveness is possible because 
naval capabilities are evolving in important ways. 
2. Precise and Persistent Firepower 
Sea Basing is the foundation for Sea Strike and Sea Shield, complementary 
capabilities that strengthen deterrence and warfighting.  Sea-based offensive and 
defensive power assures friends and allies, enhances coalition building, and guards 
against international coercion; missions that will grow in importance as advanced 
warfighting technologies proliferate. 
Sea-based forces are projecting power over longer distances and with far greater 
precision than in the past.  For example, the F/A-18 C/D, the current workhorse of the 
fleet, has an unrefueled operational mission radius of approximately 500 miles.  The F/A-
18 E/F Super Hornet, which already has flown combat missions in the war on terrorism, 
extends that range to more than 650 miles.  The Joint Strike Fighter, which will enter the 
fleet in the next decade, will have a combat radius of 800 miles.  The MV-22 tilt-rotor 
aircraft will have five times the range of current helicopters and the Advanced Gun 
System will support maneuver forces by extending precision gunfire from 10 miles to 
100 miles, vastly increasing the target set vulnerable to sea-based gunfire.  At the same 
time, the Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicle will provide the Marine Corps much 
needed over the horizon mobility and remarkably improved firepower. 
Increased range is augmented with increased precision.  Over the past ten years, 
precision weapons with extended standoff capability have advanced from a niche 
capability to an operational requirement.  During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, 
precision weapons represented only 10% of munitions expended.  In 2001, during the 
initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, precision weapons 
accounted for more than 90% of weapons employed.  This ability to effectively target and 
engage with pinpoint accuracy gives our forces the scaleable combat power necessary to 
dominate today's military environment.  In addition, efficiencies inherent in precision 
strike radiate from the battlefield to the factory, requiring fewer weapons to be produced, 
shipped, stored, and employed.  This movement from mass to precision greatly enhances 
the effectiveness of Sea Basing. 
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The sliding scale between mass and precision is equally evident in maneuver.  In 
step with the improvements achieved in precision weaponry is a complementary shift 
toward precision maneuver.  Netted intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance with 
increased speed of seaborne and airborne platforms permit the discernment and rapid 
maneuver against and exploitation of gaps in an adversary's defenses.  Precision 
navigation systems allow forces to move through cleared lanes created in obstacle belts 
and minefields, eliminating the need to clear entire shorelines.  Sea Basing also improves 
the speed by which maneuver forces operate by retaining command and control, fire 
support, and logistics functions at sea.  Precision maneuver capitalizes on the improved 
accuracy of fire support systems and munitions to enable a tempo of operations the 
adversary cannot match. 
3. Operational Maneuver at and From the Sea 
The essence of Sea Basing is the exploitation of the sea, an obstacle for those who 
cannot control it, as maneuver space for friendly forces.  By controlling the sea, the U.S. 
Navy creates a sanctuary for joint forces.  Using the sea as maneuver space, afloat forces 
are capable of presenting an adversary with a mobile and multidimensional threat that 
overextends his capabilities and generates exploitable gaps and vulnerabilities.  The 
inherent operational mobility of the sea base enables naval forces to place enemy forces 
and critical infrastructure at risk across the length of his coastline.  The significantly 
expanded operational reach enabled by sea-based fires and maneuver capabilities will 
further increase an adversary's vulnerabilities deep inland.  This power projection 
capability can be exploited for forcible entry, enabling the establishment ashore of 
follow-on land based joint forces.  Subsequently, the maneuver capabilities of the sea 
base will allow naval forces to operate opportunistically off an adversary's coast, striking 
from the sea with fire and maneuver as vulnerabilities are discerned or created. 
The economy and benefits of sea-based maneuver are best appreciated from the 
perspective of the enemy, who faced with a combined arms sea-based threat is placed on 
the horns of a dilemma.  He can dissipate his force along the length of his coast or 
concentrate forces at strategic points; in either case naval and joint forces will maneuver 
throughout the battle space to defeat local forces in detail while striking critical nodes.  
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By placing the enemy in a no-win situation, sea-based forces contribute greatly to the 
joint campaign and fully exploit the advantages of sea control. 
4. Global Connectivity 
Tremendous advances in afloat connectivity over the past decade have knitted 
sea-based forces into the larger world around us.  Situational awareness is shared real-
time across all forces and with theater and national decision-makers.  Support data have 
increased dramatically, providing greater efficiency, higher readiness, and access to 
expertise and information through reach-back systems.  Collaborative planning and 
training systems, including video teleconferencing from sea, allow forces to arrive on 
scene with the latest information, ready for immediate employment.  This web of 
connectivity turns individual ships into elements of a dispersed but integrated force—a 
sea base—from which commanders exercise control in secure and mobile facilities, 
accelerating the speed and accuracy of assessment, decision, and action at every level of 
command. 
5. Responsive Logistics 
Twenty-first century operational logistics increasingly will leverage information 
to achieve efficiencies and provide support at the time and place of greatest impact.  This 
shift toward anticipatory, responsive logistics—which is just beginning—will make Sea 
Basing of integrated joint logistics support increasingly possible, minimizing dependence 
on large and vulnerable bases ashore. 
In pursuit of this goal, sea-based logistics are building upon a rich tradition that 
includes the legendary World War II fleet train of support ships that operated just behind 
the battle fleets.  Today's Military Sealift Command (MSC) has inherited this role.  
Comprised of 119 fully operational ships—72% of which are deployed at any time—and 
another 96 surge ships, MSC supports fleet operations with oilers, stores ships, 
ammunition ships, ocean-going tugs, hospital ships, and other vessels.  In addition, MSC 
has maintained prepositioned support forces in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, and 
Western Pacific since the early 1980s.  These assets are truly joint, including 40 ships to 
supply the Marine Corps, Army, Navy, and Air Force.  By keeping these arsenals of U.S. 
firepower in theater, MSC provides the nation with decreased deployment and 
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employment timelines, expanded military options, and greater operational responsiveness 
to the joint force commander. 
The Naval Supply Systems Command is another important change agent in 
enhanced Sea Basing.  Its more than 8,000 logistics professionals are striving to achieve 
one-touch supply on a global scale, providing web-based, single-point-of-entry support to 
save customer time and increase anticipation of demand.  As with the MSC, the Naval 
Supply Systems Command is expanding its partnership with the other services and the 
Defense Logistics Agency by leveraging information technologies and expanded 
communications tools to increase situational awareness and capture joint efficiencies.  
The result will be improved speed of response and operational agility. 
6. The Way Ahead 
We are only beginning to exploit the full potential of Sea Basing.  In support of 
joint and coalition operations, maritime forces will provide Sea Strike and Sea Shield 
capabilities of unprecedented range and accuracy, global connectivity of great capacity 
and survivability, and streamlined logistics to support joint forces throughout the battle 
space.  Sea-based forces will minimize reliance on ashore infrastructure by challenging 
all assumptions that result in the shore basing of operational capabilities.  The reasoning 
is direct: less reliance on shore basing equals more operational flexibility.  This means 
taking advantage of every opportunity to place enhanced capabilities at sea and 
improving the reach, persistence, and sustainability of systems that already are based 
afloat. 
7. Improved Joint Effectiveness 
The future is all about jointness, from initial planning through mission 
completion.  Every facet of sea-based operations must focus on the bigger picture.  
Defensive assurance will be derived from the integration of complementary joint 
capabilities, and strike options of every type will be planned and executed in a joint 
context.  Afloat operations will be tailored and timed so that their impact folds smoothly 
into joint strategic, operational, and tactical plans.  The fully integrated battle space of the 
future may witness not only Special Operations Forces operating from the maritime 
domain, but also Air Force unmanned combat vehicles surging to sea bases rather than 
65 
bedding down ashore.  Readily available forward-operating bases will be central to joint 
operations in the 21st century, and, while not invulnerable, there is no forward-staging 
area more secure and sovereign than a sea base. 
Seamless joint communications lie at the heart of effective Sea Basing.  As part of 
that effort, the Navy is lead agent for developing a new deployable joint command-and-
control system to provide a rapidly accessible and flexible common planning tool for all 
services to share.  Such communications must leverage fully the capabilities of joint, 
theater, and national systems, as well as those of allies, coalition partners, and friends.  
This web of awareness must reach beyond the military, to include other agencies such as 
the new Department of Homeland Security, the intelligence organizations, and civilian 
relief and international aid groups.  In an era of preemptive defense, we must shape the 
strategic and operational environment by engaging as early as possible with every 
available tool. 
Sea Basing is also a catalyst for coalition building, because it is politically and 
logistically easier for nations to contribute to a sea-based effort than to commit land 
forces.  In future operations, international data-sharing networks will make available 
local knowledge, regional intelligence, and operational specialties needed for effective 
campaign planning.  This demands the development of communications systems that are 
accessible to other nations, including the portability and safeguards required to optimize 
coalition operations. 
8. Increased Reach and Responsiveness 
On-scene presence and operational freedom are vital to deterring and defeating 
current and future threats, ranging from regional adversaries to transnational terrorists 
and criminal organizations.  The Navy-Marine Corps team will meet this challenge by 
greater integration with each other and with the larger joint force.  Naval forces will 
provide distributed, netted striking power around the world to swiftly attack wherever 
threats appear. 
New and better systems are key to expanded reach.  The new CVN(X) nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier will be the first major update of the fleet's most powerful weapon 
system in a quarter century.  It will launch very long-range manned and unmanned strike 
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craft, be powered by a new propulsion plant that will include greatly expanded electrical-
generating capacity, and have a more flexible flight deck, all operated and supported by a 
much smaller crew.  The new multimission DD(X) destroyer reflects this drive toward 
longer-range weapons, more efficient crewing, and greater emphasis on electric systems, 
eventually leading to electric propulsion and weapons.  The follow-on CG(X) cruisers 
will project defensive shields over entire regions, placing a new tool of great value into 
the hands of decision makers.  Improved amphibious assault ships such as the LHA(R) 
and LPD-17 will maneuver forward presence forces to shape events in the early stages of 
conflict.  These new expeditionary warfare platforms will provide a limited but 
responsive forcible entry capability to enable rapid reinforcement by follow-on sea-based 
forces. 
Increased combat power also will rely on an array of advanced weapons and 
sensors.  Long-dwell unmanned sensors will be projected vast distances on, over, and 
under the sea, providing the persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
critical to 21st century warfighting.  Next-generation missiles, aircraft, and unmanned 
vehicles will provide rich streams of information, to include optical, infrared, audio, 
seismic, radiological, magnetic, and thermal returns.  These sensors will guide very fast, 
very precise strikes best suited to a rapidly changing battlefield.  Information operations 
will complement strike missions with non-kinetic attack at vital enemy systems.  High-
speed sealift, tilt-rotor aircraft, and advanced assault amphibious craft will provide more 
mobility and flexibility in support of power projection forces while also increasing 
sustained support.  In short, sea-based forces will leverage improved intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, precision fire support, and enhanced 
mobility to generate combat power on a scale previously provided by far heavier and less 
agile forces. 
New platforms and technologies will be implemented by new concepts of 
operations.  To provide greater striking power and responsiveness, amphibious ready 
groups are being augmented with dedicated surface combatants and submarines, to 
produce expeditionary strike groups, thereby distributing the offensive power of the fleet 
more widely while increasing area control and surveillance capabilities.  Expeditionary 
strike groups will operate independently against transnational threats, and they will 
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combine with carrier strike groups and maritime prepositioning groups to form 
expeditionary strike forces when countering major adversaries. 
To further develop sea-based reach and responsiveness, joint experimentation will 
be aggressively pursued.  Today, the Navy-Marine Corps team and U.S. Joint Forces 
Command are working together to incorporate naval efforts into joint exercises whenever 
possible.  Concurrent with that effort, the naval services are working with the Army on 
high-speed vessels, with the Air Force on unmanned aerial vehicles, and with the Coast 
Guard on its Deepwater project.  The goal is to develop as many common systems as 
possible, to maximize the utility of joint Sea Basing.  In addition, we must define 
concepts and doctrine that codify how we will work together more effectively in the 
future as a unified military force. 
9. Enhanced On-Scene Endurance 
Being there is what sea-based forces are all about, and the naval services are 
dedicated to finding innovative ways to increase on-scene endurance.  Enhanced on-
station presence will compress deployment and employment timelines and increase the 
operational effectiveness of every Sailor and Marine. 
Maritime Prepositioned Force-Future (MPF[F]) ships will be central to this effort.  
These platforms will sustain in-theater logistics, communications, and medical 
capabilities, providing joint operational and logistical support while remaining on-station 
for extended periods.  MPF(F) ships will enhance the responsiveness of the joint team by 
the at-sea assembly of a Marine expeditionary brigade that arrives by high-speed airlift or 
sealift from the United States or advanced bases.  They will off-load forces, weapons, and 
supplies selectively while remaining far over the horizon and reconstitute ground 
maneuver forces aboard ship after completing assaults deep inland.  The impact of these 
ships will be significant, because prepositioned support will not be limited to unloading 
supplies in port after troops have moved ashore.  They will sustain the force and allow 
the joint force commander to rapidly reposition and retask for other operational missions.  
MPF(F) ships will serve a broader operational function than current prepositioned 
shipping, creating greatly expanded operational flexibility and effectiveness. 
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In the near future, on-station time will be enhanced by improved vertical delivery 
capabilities provided by the MH-60S helicopter and MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft.  High-
speed sealift will provide far more flexible, efficient, and secure support by way of inter- 
and intra-theater sustainment and transportation.  MSC already is sailing the WestPac 
Express, a 101-meter vessel that averages 35 knots while transporting nearly 1,000 
Marines.  This results in more efficient training and lower costs than provided by airlift.  
Another high-speed vessel, Joint Venture, is being employed on the U.S. East Coast for 
experimentation with the Army, while a third has been placed on order to work with the 
Mine Warfare Command in Ingleside, Texas. 
The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will take the concept of being there to new 
heights, applying cutting-edge technology and innovative operational concepts to provide 
increased presence in the littorals.  Designed from the keel up to be very fast and mission 
flexible, it has the potential to remain forward deployed for extended periods, supporting 
carrier and expeditionary strike groups while sustaining access to vital waters for trade 
and military operations.  In addition, the Navy is conducting experiments with rotational 
crewing to enhance on-scene endurance, and optimum manning initiatives are being 
implemented in fleet units to reduce crew size while increasing sustainability. 
More advanced technologies lie further ahead.  Future sea bases might include 
highly capable joint command centers, aircraft operating areas, and sea-to-shore craft of 
unprecedented speed and lift.  Future logistical capabilities include enhanced hull-to-hull 
transfer systems for heavy cargo, revolutionary crane designs, advanced strike-up/strike-
down cargo handling equipment, improved fenders employing electromagnetic 
technologies, and new fuel transfer systems for greater safety and efficiency.  Someday, 
sea bases may even be supplied by ultra-large airships capable of vertically delivering 
more than 1,000 tons of cargo after transiting from airstrips in the United States or 
elsewhere around the world. 
10. Asymmetric Military Advantage 
Enhanced and networked Sea Basing will allow us to do more from the sea than 
ever before, operating as a fully integrated joint force to deliver major increases in 
operational effectiveness.  By doing so, it will extend to the joint force advantages 
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historically enjoyed by naval forces, such as freedom of action, immediate employability, 
increased security, and sustained access.  Sea Basing is transformational, but it is not a 
panacea.  It will remain an operational-level capability that relies on the strategic basing 
support of overseas friends and allies outside the joint operations area. 
In the years ahead, afloat command and control will be seamless, global, and 
secure.  Resupply of joint forces from the sea will be safer, faster, and more efficient.  
Naval firepower will range across the joint battle space, and sea-based maneuver forces 
will penetrate deep into enemy territory.  Prepositioned assets will remain on station for 
extended periods.  Greater integration with joint and coalition forces will result in 
increased situational awareness, enhanced regional stability, and—should crises occur—
an accelerated flow of combat and support forces throughout the theater of operations. 
Twenty-first-century Sea Basing will be our nation's asymmetric military 
advantage, contributing immeasurably to global peace, international stability, and 
warfighting effectiveness.  It is the key to operational independence in the dangerous 
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APPENDIX C EXPEDITIONARY MANEUVER WARFARE 
The following is published by the Untied States Marine Corps and written by 
former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General J.L. Jones.  This publication is 
included in its entirety and verbatim as the third doctrinal piece to provide a context and a 
background for the need of a new command and control organization such as the 
Expeditionary Battle Staff. 
 
EXPEDITIONARY MANEUVER WARFARE 
 
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare is the Marine Corps’ capstone concept for the 
early 21st century.  It is built on our core competencies and prepares the Marine Corps, as 
a “total force,” to meet the challenges and opportunities of a rapidly changing world.  
Capitalizing on our maneuver warfare philosophy and expeditionary heritage, the concept 
contains the enduring characteristics and evolving capabilities, upon which the Marine 
Corps will rely, to promote peace and stability and mitigate or resolve crises as part of a 
joint force.  EMW focuses Marine Corps competencies, evolving capabilities, and 
innovative concepts to ensure that we provide the joint force commander (JFC) with 
forces optimized for forward presence, engagement, crisis response, antiterrorism, and 
warfighting. 
The purpose of this document is to articulate to future JFCs and contemporary 
joint concept developers the Marine Corps’ contribution to future joint operations. EMW 
serves as the basis for influencing the Joint Concept Development and Experimentation 
Process and the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System. It further 
refines the broad axis of advance identified in Marine Corps Strategy 21 for future 
capability enhancements. 
A. JOINT AND MULTI-NATIONAL ENABLING 
Marine forces possess the capabilities to provide the means or opportunity to 
make joint and multinational operations possible. Enabling operations may be as basic as 
establishing the initial command and control (C2) system that the assembling joint or 
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multinational force “plugs into,” or as complex as physically seizing forward operating 
bases for follow-on forces. Other examples of enabling operations include defeating 
enemy antiaccess capabilities and serving as an operational maneuver element to exploit 
joint force success or open new fronts. Marine forces are ready to serve as the lead 
elements of a joint force, act as joint enablers, and/or serve as joint task force (JTF) or 
functional component commanders (i.e., Joint Force Land Component Commander, Joint 
Force Air Component Commander, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander). 
1. Strategic Agility 
Marine forces will rapidly transition from precrisis state to full operational 
capability in a distant theater. This requires uniformly ready forces, sustainable and easily 
task-organized for multiple missions or functions. They must be agile, lethal, swift to 
deploy, and always prepared to move to the scene of an emergency or conflict. 
2. Operational Reach 
Marine forces will project and sustain relevant and effective power across the 
depth of the battlespace. 
3. Tactical Flexibility 
Marine forces will conduct multiple, concurrent, dissimilar missions, rapidly 
transitioning from one task to the next, providing multidimensional capabilities (air, land, 
and sea) to the joint team.  For example, tactical flexibility allows the same forward-
deployed Marine force to evacuate noncombatants from troubled areas, conduct 
antiterrorism/force protection operations, and seize critical infrastructure to enable 
follow-on forces. 
4. Support and Sustainment 
Marine forces will provide focused logistics to enable power projection 
independent of host nation support against distant objectives across the breadth and depth 
of a theater of operations. 
These capabilities enhance the joint force’s ability to reassure and encourage our 




B. STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE 
United States’ interests will continue to be challenged by an array of national and 
nonstate actors posing conventional and asymmetrical threats. These threats are made 
more complex and lethal by the increased availability of militarily-applicable commercial 
technologies. As the technological gap between the United States and its potential 
adversaries narrows, our leadership, doctrine, and training will be fundamental to 
maintaining our continued military advantage. We expect potential adversaries to adapt 
their tactics, weaponry, and antiaccess strategies to confront us on terms of relative 
advantage.  Specifically, adversaries will seek to engage us where they perceive us to be 
weak. Aware of our ability to degrade complex systems, the thinking adversary will opt 
for the use of sophisticated but autonomous weapons. Knowing our thirst for information, 
they will promote uncertainty, confusion, and chaos. This is the venue where our most 
persistent and determined adversaries will choose to operate.  Our Nation must be 
prepared to fight—worldwide—against adversaries who will seek to engage us with 
asymmetric capabilities rooted deep in the human dimension of conflict. The Marine 
Corps, with our philosophy of maneuver warfare and heritage of expeditionary 
operations, is ideally suited to succeed in this challenging landscape. 
1. Expeditionary Advantage 
The Marine Corps’ expeditionary advantage is derived from combining our 
maneuver warfare philosophy; expeditionary culture; and the manner in which we 
organize, deploy, and employ our forces.  EMW capitalizes on this combination, 
providing the JFC with a total force in readiness that is prepared to operate with other 
Services and multinational forces in the full range of military operations from peacetime 
engagement to major theater war. 
2. Maneuver Warfare 
The Marine Corps approach to warfare, as codified in Marine Corps Doctrinal 
Publication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting, is the product of years of conceptual development, 
innovation, and experience. Maneuver warfare, the philosophical basis for EMW, 
acknowledges the timeless realities of human conflict and does not attempt to redefine 
war on more humane or less risky terms. The fundamental nature of war—A violent 
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struggle between hostile, independent, irreconcilable wills characterized by chaos, 
friction, and uncertainty—will remain unchanged as it transcends advancements in 
technology. What has changed is the gradual shift in reliance from the quantitative 
characteristics of warfare—mass and volume—to a realization that qualitative factors 
(speed, stealth, precision, and sustainability) have become increasingly important facets 
of modern warfare. Maneuver warfare stresses proactive thought and action, elevating the 
operational art beyond the crude simplicity of attrition. 
It combines high tempo operations with a bias for action to achieve advantage—
physical, temporal, or conditional—relative to an adversary. The aim is to shatter an 
adversary’s cohesion, succeed in other operations by rapid action to mitigate damage, or 
resolve a crisis on favorable terms. Maneuver warfare encourages decentralized 
decisionmaking, enabling Marines to exploit the chaotic nature of combat. Decentralizing 
decisionmaking allows Marines to compress the decision cycle, seize fleeting 
opportunity, and engage enemy forces from positions of advantage, which empowers us 
to outthink, outmaneuver, and outfight our adversary. 
4. Expeditionary Operations 
For Marines, the term expeditionary connotes more than the mere capability to 
deploy overseas when needed. Expeditionary is our ethos; a pervasive mindset that 
influences all aspects of organizing, training, and equipping by acknowledging the 
necessity to adapt to the conditions mandated by the battlespace. Expeditionary 
operations are typically conducted in austere environments, from sea, land or forward 
bases. They will likely require Marines and other naval forces to be brought to bear 
without reliance on host nation or outside support. As a tangible representation of our 
national interest, forward-deployed and forward-based Marines remain both a key 
element of America’s expeditionary advantage and are critical to the regional combatant 
commander’s or commander in chief’s (CINC’s) overall strategy. 
The regional CINC will set the broad conditions for shaping the battlespace 
through engagement, forward presence, and the application of a full range of response 
options. As a critical component of each regional CINC’s Theater Engagement Plan, 
forward-deployed Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) and forward-based Marines 
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execute multinational training exercises, conduct mobile training teams, and participate in 
military-to-military exchanges. Through these activities, Marines develop invaluable 
regional expertise, cultural and situational awareness, and an appreciation of the 
interoperability required for successful joint and multinational operations. 
Marine forces, as a part of the regional CINC’s engagement strategy, will focus 
on access operations or other assigned missions as a part of the right mix of 
joint/multinational forces. These operations may be as basic as establishing the initial C2 
system that the assembling joint or multinational force “plugs into” or as complex as 
physically seizing forward operating bases for follow-on forces. Throughout the conduct 
of operations, Marines will seek to leverage the unique and complementary capabilities 
of other Services and agencies in order to provide the JFC with a fully integrated force. 
5. Seabasing 
Marine forces, as an integral component of a larger naval force, will be prepared 
to influence events within the world’s littorals using the sea as maneuver space and as a 
secure “base” from which JFCs can project power to impact the early stages of a potential 
crisis. Seabasing supports versatile and flexible power projection. Seabasing enables 
forces to move directly from ship to objectives deep inland and represents a significant 
advance from traditional, phased amphibious operations. Seabased operations maximize 
naval power projection and enhance the deployment and employment of naval 
expeditionary forces by JFCs. More than a family of platforms afloat, seabasing will 
network platforms and promote interoperability among the amphibious task force, carrier 
battle group, maritime pre-position force, combat logistics force, and emerging high-
speed sealift and lighterage technologies. Seabased operations will capitalize on the 
maneuver space afforded by the sea, rapid force closure through at-sea arrival and 
assembly, and the protection assured by the U.S. Navy’s control of the sea. C2, combat 
support, and combat service support capabilities will remain at sea to the maximum 
extent possible and be focused upon supporting expeditionary air and land operations 
ashore. Forward-deployed naval forces will have access to a responsive worldwide 
logistic system to sustain expeditionary operations. Seabasing will allow Marine forces to 
commence sustainable operations, enable the flow of follow-on forces into theater, and 
expedite the reconstitution and redeployment of Marine forces for follow-on missions. 
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C. MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCES 
Marines typically deploy and employ as scalable, tailorable, combined-arms 
teams known as MAGTFs. All MAGTFs, regardless of size, share four common 
organizational elements that vary in size and composition according to the mission: 
command element (CE), ground combat element (GCE), aviation combat element (ACE), 
and combat service support element (CSSE). Organic to each MAGTF, regardless of size, 
are specialized antiterrorism and force protection capabilities that are available to support 
the JFC. Fully interoperable, each MAGTF will have the ability to serve as a JTF 
headquarters or as a functional or Service component commander of a JTF. 
In partnership with the Navy, Marine forces will use the capabilities of bases and 
stations and selected naval platforms as “launch pads” to flow into theater. During 
deployment, Marine forces will conduct collaborative planning and execute en route 
mission training and virtual rehearsals. They will capitalize on shared situational 
awareness that is developed in support of the JFC and processed and distributed by the 
supporting establishment. These enhancements will revolutionize the otherwise time-
intensive reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) activities, 
allowing increased operational tempo and seizing early opportunities as the enabling 
force for the JFC. Forward-deployed Navy and Marine forces will continue to be the 
JFC’s optimal enabling force, prepared to open ports and airfields and to establish 
expeditionary airfields and intermediate staging bases in either benign or hostile 
environments. 
1. Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) 
The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]), in 
close partnership with the Navy, will continue to be the on-scene/on-call enabler for 
follow-on Marine or joint forces. Operating forward-deployed from the sea, the 
MEU(SOC) is unconstrained by regional infrastructure requirements or restrictions 
imposed by other nations. Because of its forward presence, situational awareness, rapid 
response planning capability, and organic sustainment, the MEU(SOC) will continue to 
be the JFC’s immediately employable combined-arms force of choice. 
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The MEU(SOC) initiates humanitarian assistance, provides force protection, 
conducts noncombatant evacuations, enables JTF C2, and facilitates the introduction of 
follow-on forces conducting limited forcible entry operations when required. These early 
actions shape the JFC’s battlespace, deter potential aggressors, defuse volatile situations, 
minimize the damage caused by natural disasters, and alleviate human suffering. 
Increasing mobility, speed, firepower, and tactical lift will enable this seabased, self-
sustained, combined-arms force to conduct expeditionary operations across the depth of 
the battlespace, in adverse conditions, day or night. 
2. Marine Expeditionary Brigade 
The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is optimally scaled and task-organized 
to respond to a full range of crises. Strategically deployed via a variety of modes 
(amphibious shipping and strategic airlift and sealift) and poised for sustainable power 
projection, the MEB will continue to provide a robust seabased forcible entry capability. 
It will use organic combined-arms and the complementary capabilities from the other 
Services—such as netted sensors, seabased fires, and advanced mine countermeasures—
to locate, counter, or penetrate vulnerable seams in an adversary’s access denial systems. 
The MEB will then close rapidly on critical objectives via air, land, and sea to achieve 
decisive results. It can be used to enable the introduction of follow-on forces (joint and 
multinational) or be employed as an independent operational maneuver element in 
support of the JFC’s campaign plan. The MEB constitutes a multidimensional, seabased 
or landbased, operational “capability in readiness” that can create its own opportunities or 
exploit opportunities resulting from the activities of other components of the joint force. 
3. Marine Expeditionary Force 
As a crisis escalates, smaller MAGTFs and supporting units are deployed until a 
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is in place to support the CINC. The MEF, largest of 
the MAGTFs, is capable of concurrent seabased operations and sustained operations 
ashore, operating either independently or as part of a joint warfighting team.  The MEF 




4. Specialized Marine Corps Organizations and Capabilities 
Special purpose MAGTFs are nonstanding organizations temporarily formed to 
conduct specific missions for which a MEF or other unit is either inappropriate or 
unavailable. They are organized, trained, and equipped to perform a specific mission such 
as force protection, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacetime engagement 
activities, or regionally focused exercises. While the MAGTF construct will remain the 
primary warfighting organization of the Marine Corps, not all situations will require it to 
operate as a combined-arms unit. Should the situation warrant, distinct MAGTF elements 
and capabilities may be employed separately in response to critical JFC requirements. 
For example, the 4th MEB (AT) is a unique organization with specialized 
antiterrorism capabilities. This unit consists of Marines and Sailors specifically trained to 
respond rapidly—worldwide—to threats or actual attacks by terrorists. The 4th MEB 
(AT) contains the Marine Corps Security Force Battalion (fleet antiterrorism security 
teams), the Marine Security Guard Battalion, the Chemical Biological Incident Response 
Force, and an infantry battalion specially trained in antiterrorism operations. 
5. Supporting Establishment 
Marine Corps bases and stations provide direct and indirect support to the 
MAGTF and other forward-deployed forces and are the means by which Marine forces 
are formed, trained, and maintained. These bases and stations are platforms from which 
Marines project expeditionary power while supporting the quality of life of Marines and 
their families. 
6. The Way Ahead 
Marine Corps Strategy 21 identifies capability enhancements required to continue 
the evolution of the MAGTF. These capability enhancements include joint/multinational 
enabling, strategic agility, operational reach, tactical flexibility, and support and 
sustainment, which create a Marine force that provides the JFC with expanded power in 
order to assure friends and allies or dissuade, deter, and defeat adversaries. In accordance 
with our expeditionary culture and warfighting ethos, our doctrine, organization, 
education, and training must contribute to producing Marines and organizations that 
thrive in the chaos of conflict by— 
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• Producing leaders who have the experience to judge what needs to be 
done; know how to do it; and exhibit traits of trust, nerve, and restraint. 
• Developing leaders and staffs who function in an environment of 
ambiguity and uncertainty and make timely and effective decisions under 
stress. 
• Developing leaders by improving their capacity to recognize patterns, 
distinguish critical information, and make decisions quickly on an intuitive 
basis with less than perfect information. 
• Enhancing leaders’ decisionmaking skills with investments in education, 
wargaming/combat simulation activities, and battespace visualization 
techniques within a joint or multinational framework. 
We will see a convergence of transformation and modernization capabilities in 
our MAGTFs that will revolutionize expeditionary operations when currently planned 
programs mature. Realizing EMW’s full potential will require a developmental effort 
focused on improving C2, maneuver, intelligence, integrated fires, logistic, force 
protection, and information operations. Achieving these improvements will require 
integration of both Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts, systems, and 
acquisition strategies. 
D. ORGANIZATION, DEPLOYMENT, AND EMPLOYMENT 
Changes in operational and functional concepts may necessitate changes in the 
integrating concepts of organization, deployment, and employment. Organizationally, 
EMW emphasizes the MEB as the preferred mid-intensity MAGTF and the role of the 
supporting establishment in direct support of forward operations. Organizational structure 
must be mission oriented to ensure the effective deployment, employment, sustainment, 
reconstitution, and redeployment of forces. The Marine supporting establishment must be 
postured to facilitate situational awareness of worldwide operations, leverage information 
technologies, and exploit modern logistic concepts in order to anticipate and respond to 
MAGTF requirements. 
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Marines will deploy using any combination of enhanced amphibious platforms, 
strategic sealift and airlift, prepositioned assets, and self-deployment options to rapidly 
project force throughout the world. By virtue of their en route collaborative planning and 
virtual rehearsal capability, Marine forces will arrive in theater ready for immediate 
employment. While Marines achieve great operational synergy when employed as fully 
integrated MAGTFs, the Marine Corps can provide specific forces and capabilities 
according to the needs of the JFC. Continuing our tradition of innovation, we must strive 
to enhance our concepts and technologies to organize, deploy, and employ the force. 
1. Maneuver 
Maneuver in all dimensions—land, air, and, uniquely, operational maneuver from 
the sea—enables commanders to exploit enemy weakness at the time and place of their 
choosing through the use of the operational mobility inherent in naval forces. Maneuver 
seeks to achieve decisive effects during the conduct of a joint campaign. It is the means 
of concentrating force at critical points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and 
momentum, which drives adversaries into untenable situations. Maneuver can deny the 
enemy the initiative, reducing his choices to either defending the length and depth of the 
littorals, thereby dislocating his forces to the JTF’s advantage or exposing critical 
vulnerabilities to exploitation. Enemy forces reacting to MAGTF maneuver generate 
opportunities for the JFC to concentrate the complementary capabilities of other 
maneuver forces. Maneuver, integrated with fires, will be linked to and influenced by the 
JFC’s battlespace shaping operations and directed toward achieving operational effects. 
Innovative technologies will provide Marines enhanced mobility to cross greater 
distances and reduce the limitations imposed by terrain, weather, and access denial 
systems. The result will be an expanded maneuver space, both seaward and inland. 
Enhancements in our maneuver capability will compel adversaries to develop 
innovative antiaccess strategies and systems. Proactive joint efforts to anticipate and 





2. Integrated Fires 
Fires involve more than the mere delivery of ordnance on a target. The 
psychological impact on an adversary of volume and seemingly random fires cannot be 
underestimated. The human dimension of conflict entails shattering an enemy’s cohesion 
through the introduction of fear and terror. Marines, applying the tenets of maneuver 
warfare, will continue to exploit integrated fires and maneuver to shatter the cohesion of 
an adversary. 
We will increasingly leverage seabased and aviation-based fires and develop 
shore-based fire support systems with improved operational and tactical mobility. 
Streamlining our fire support coordination procedures and enhancements in combat 
identification techniques will support rapidly maneuvering forces while decreasing the 
risks of fratricide. Forces afloat and ashore require the ability to immediately distinguish 
friendly forces from others and to then deliver lethal and nonlethal fires with increased 
range and improved accuracy to achieve the desired effect. Volume and precision of fires 
are equally important.  The continuous availability of high volume, all-weather fires is 
essential for suppression, obscuration, area denial, and harassment missions. We will use 
fires to support maneuver just as we use maneuver to exploit the effects of fires. 
3. Intelligence 
Intelligence is a command function that optimizes the quality and speed of 
decisionmaking. EMW requires a thorough blending of the traditional domains of 
operations and intelligence. Commanders and their staffs must make decisions in an 
environment of chaos, uncertainty, and complexity, and they must be prepared to act on 
incomplete information. The goal of intelligence is to enable the commander to discern 
the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities and exploit them. 
Intelligence must support decisionmaking by maintaining current situational 
awareness, monitoring indications and warnings, identifying potential targets, and 
assessing the adversary’s intent and capabilities at all levels of operations. This requires 
establishing an intelligence baseline that includes order of battle, geographic factors, and 
cultural information; all contained in universally accessible databases. 
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Deployed Marine forces will enhance their organic capabilities by accessing and 
leveraging national, theater, Service, and multinational intelligence through a 
comprehensive intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance network. The informed 
judgment of well-trained, educated, and experienced Marine analysts and collectors will 
remain the most important intelligence asset. 
4. Logistics 
Marines must access a worldwide infrastructure of distribution systems to support 
expeditionary operations.  The integration of naval expeditionary logistic capabilities 
with joint information and logistic systems will provide total asset visibility and a 
common relevant operating picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician across 
Services and support agencies. Marines must explore ways to reduce the logistic footprint 
ashore through expeditionary support bases, seabased support, in-stride sustainment, 
reduction of consumables, improved packaging, better visibility over distribution, and 
development of alternative ordnance variants that are smaller and lighter, but retain 
equivalent lethality. 
5. Command and Control 
EMW promotes decentralized execution providing subordinates latitude to 
accomplish assigned tasks in accordance with the commander’s intent. Organic and 
supporting C2 systems and processes must be adapted to function in any environment, 
whether afloat, transitioning ashore, or on the move. C2 must facilitate decentralized 
decisionmaking and enhanced situational awareness at all echelons.  Concurrently, C2 
must provide the MAGTF commander the ability to direct joint and multinational task 
force operations when required. 
EMW requires adaptable and intuitive C2 architectures and systems that are fully 
interoperable with joint and compatible with multinational assets. Expeditionary forces 
will be able to access, manipulate, and use information in near real time, developing a 
common tactical and operational understanding of the battlespace. They will have 
connectivity to theater and national assets and the ability to disseminate information 
throughout the force. This will support fully integrated collaborative planning efforts 
during both deployment and employment. 
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C2 initiatives must address limitations in the capabilities of all amphibious 
platforms. Key factors include accelerated technological advances and rapid changes in 
equipment and capabilities. Flexibility, adaptability, and interoperability are paramount in 
the design and development of systems and platforms. Particular attention must be made 
to providing commanders with seamless C2 capabilities throughout the battlespace.  
6. Force Protection 
Force protection are those measures taken to protect a force’s fighting potential so 
that it can be applied at the appropriate time and place. Force protection will rely on the 
integrated application of a full range of both proactive and reactive capabilities. 
Multidimensional force protection is achieved through the tailored selection and 
application of layered active and passive measures within all domains across the range of 
military operations—or warfighting functions—with an acceptable level of risk. 
We will pursue improvements in the families of technologies and doctrine to 
enhance force protection capabilities. Marine forces will enhance security programs 
designed to protect servicemembers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and 
equipment in all locations and situations. These enhancements will be accomplished 
through innovative technological and nontechnology-based solutions combined with 
planned and integrated application of antiterrorism measures, physical security, 
operations security, personal protection, and incident response. 
7. Information Operations 
Information operations involve actions taken to affect the adversary’s 
decisionmaking processes and information systems while ensuring the integrity of our 
own. The integrated components of information operations have always proven 
applicable across the full range of military operations. Information operations will be 
used to shape the strategic environment or impart a clearer understanding and perception 
of a specific mission and its purpose. Information operations will be a force multiplier—
reducing the adversary’s ability to effectively position and control his forces—and 
prepare the way for the MAGTF to accomplish future missions. We must leverage 
information operations and ensure they are synchronized with the JFC’s campaign plan to 
achieve the desired operational effect. 
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E. SUMMARY 
EMW describes the Marine Corps’ unique contribution to future joint and 
multinational operations. As the Nation’s only seabased, forward-deployed, air-ground 
force in readiness, Marines stand ready to support the JFC. Marines, intrinsically linked 
with naval support, maintain the means to rapidly respond to crises and respond with the 
appropriate level of force. MAGTFs are the JFC’s optimized force that will enable the 
introduction of follow-on forces and prosecute further operations. 
EMW focuses our warfighting concepts toward realizing the Marine Corps 
Strategy 21 vision of future Marine forces with enhanced expeditionary power projection 
capabilities. It links our concepts and vision for integration with emerging joint concepts. 
EMW will guide the process of change to ensure that Marine forces remain ready, 
relevant, and fully capable of supporting future joint operations.(DON 2001) 
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